Daily Report

Supplement

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-046-S
Thursday
9 March 1995

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Central Eurasia
SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-046-S *9 March 1995*

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Political Issues

Duma Deputies Ponder Yeltsin's Prospects

954Q0138A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 7, Feb 95 [Signed to press 14 Feb 95] pp 19-20

[Interview with State Duma deputies Viktor Ustinov, Gennadiy Burbulis, Yegor Gaydar: "Will Next President Not Be Yeltsin?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **We asked three State Duma deputies two questions—"Yeltsin. What's going on with him?" and "Who will be the next president of Russia?" These are the answers we received.**

Yegor GAYDAR, leader of the 'Russia's Choice' faction

1. Strange as it may seem, the December 12, 1993 elections were a key moment. I know that they were a serious shock, a heavy blow for the president. The election results could be interpreted in two ways: one point of view, which I defended, boiled down to the idea that the democrats' weak showing was due to inconsistency and compromises in conducting reforms. The elections demonstrated quite convincingly, I thought, that we should take a very strict attitude towards financial stabilization, and towards reforming the army, the social sphere and state organs. And only then would we have a chance of coming to the presidential elections with a low inflation rate, a stable currency exchange rate, a growing economy and greater prosperity.

However, the arguments made by people who drew the conclusion that, in general, none of us could care less about democracy, that we respect strength (look how strongly they voted for a man who was proposing the latest rush on the south!), that we need a more pro-imperial, stricter policy, more metal in our voices, more state regulation, sounded much weightier. In my opinion, it is exactly this second point of view that has found its reflection in the political turn-arounds that occurred in 1994 in many areas. And in the end, it has led to Chechnya.

And on a personal note... Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is first of all a politician, a politician and a politician. This is a man who has a very strong sense of the situation and who, to an enormous extent, gives himself over to the pressure of the public mindset. For many years, he has demonstrated excellent political sensitivity. And it was obvious that he was "taking the temperature" of the political atmosphere (where should he go?), to a significant extent directing the situation into the necessary channel, but also being greatly influenced by it.

2. I don't know.

Viktor USTINOV, Committee on Geopolitics chairman (a faction of the Liberal-Democratic Party)

1. Yeltsin has been and remains a supporter of the harsh course of economic reforms that he chose at the very beginning. And this consistency, without a doubt, commands the respect of those who today consider firmness and steadfastness to be the main merit of the revolutionary course of policy that has been taken.

But, it seems to me, analysis of what is happening in the country, analysis of the consequences of the chosen course should force the president to make serious corrections in his actions. I, as chairman of the Committee on Geopolitics, can see quite clearly the full danger of the current policy in the example of the defense complex. And if Boris Nikolayevich does not replace his revolutionary style of reorganizations with one that is evolutionary, we simply run the risk of falling into an abyss.

As far as the political aspects of your question are concerned, I assume that Yeltsin, here, too, remains true to himself, consistently pursuing the consolidation of presidential power. And this should only be welcomed, as presidential power should be the main vector of state administration.

The president does not pursue this line actively enough in the regions, where his representatives frequently against his policy. Remember Peter I, who, on arriving in Arkhangelsk and discovering what his deputy was up to, as people claim, "kicked him around," all the time repeating: "Why did I send you here?" This is, of course, crude, however, on the other hand, what is the purpose of the institution of local presidential representatives besides the conduct of presidential policy?

2. Among active politicians today, I would only say Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Although it is entirely possible that new figures might appear tomorrow, who may pleasantly surprise us. These figures will most likely appear from among the burgeoning business community, but they will be businessmen of a new cast, that is, with a more national orientation.

Nor is our party lacking in this kind of businessman-patriot, and it is entirely possible that one of them will enter into competition with Zhirinovskiy. But no matter who the winner is in that competition, it will be a victory for the entire country.

Gennadiy BURBULIS

1. The situation of the specific personage in Russian political history—President Boris Yeltsin, is conditioned both by his personal actions—his merits, his mistakes and achievements,—and by the fundamental natural laws of the epoch of transition from the old Soviet political system to the developing, new Russian one.

I will pick out a few of the deep-seated causes that contribute to form the president's political aspect today.

The first cause lies in the historical exhaustion of the leader type of government that suited Russia so well at the beginning of the road. This type of government, which was so basic to Yeltsin's outstanding abilities, was

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practically unavoidable in 1990-1993, but under today's conditions, we can say objectively that its time is up.

The second cause: the unjustified absence of a well thought-out strategy for the modernization of Russia. The approach to key issues of state life boils down to impulsive, situational actions made by the Russian government (this applies to the president, as well).

And, finally, the third. The objective exhaustion of the style of political activity that has enthralled us (and Yeltsin, too) for the proceeding three years. The essence of that activity has been an accusatory atmosphere, confrontation, a public battle for clear, simple and easily distinguished goals.

There are a few other causes having to do with his individuality as a person and political actor. I have in mind most of all Yeltsin's lack of desire and inability to orient himself on a steady, stable social base, to connect himself with it through long-term obligations, and in accordance with that, to take responsibility for his decisions.

Yeltsin is psychologically unprepared to form a new system of government that would not include a stake on the individual, outwardly effective and attractive actions of the head of state.

One other cause lies in the fact that Yeltsin feels extremely uncomfortable in situations of vital and political uncertainty. He adapts poorly to circumstances that require long, everyday, non-public and restrained behavior.

The loss of basic reference points in the economic reorganizations has also played its role. A political process of such scale, accompanied by the creation of a new Russian statehood, supposes a heightened sensitivity to the intellectual and professional needs of power. The new political culture should first of all include the development of long-term strategies under conditions where the informational base is contradictory. The new coalition culture proposes taking into consideration and reconciling the interests of the dominant social groups while in the preliminary stages of work, as well as an ability to foresee the consequences of the decisions taken.

Boris Yeltsin has annoying personal weaknesses, as well, which require heightened delicacy in our evaluation of them. This is our tragedy and common pain.

2. I consider it necessary to help Yeltsin to complete his presidential term in a worthy manner. We cannot leave him without support today. But this should in no way be connected with the new presidential election.

I am convinced that none of the politicians who are directly or indirectly announcing their claims on the presidential throne today will be elected. The next president of Russia will be a person the country doesn't yet know.

Minister Mikhaylov on Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials

95WC0026A Moscow YADERNYY KONTROL: OBOZRENIYE PO PROBLEMAM ORUZHIYA MASSOVOGO UNICHTOZHENIYA V ROSSII I NOVYKH NEZAVISIMYKH GOSUDARSTVAKH in Russian No 2, Feb 95 [signed to press 30 Jan 95] pp 9-11

[Exclusive interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, RF minister of atomic energy, by YADERNYY KONTROL editor Vladimir Orlov; time and occasion not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Orlov] Viktor Nikitovich, it is well-known that your ministry has taken a number of steps in connection with the Russian President's 15 September 1994 edict on creation of a state system of recordkeeping and control of nuclear materials. At the same time it is no secret that records, control, and physical protection of nuclear materials are not at the necessary level today.

[Mikhaylov] The problem of recordkeeping, storage, and physical protection of nuclear materials has always existed, exists, and will continue to exist, and not just for Russia but for other countries as well. For example, for the United States. Why? Because no one knows the exact number of capacities for producing these materials and the exact quantity of materials already produced because of industrial losses in production. As for nuclear weapons materials, the system of recordkeeping and storage guarantees unconditional, let me repeat that, their unconditional preservation. The materials cannot "leak" anywhere.

At the same time it is necessary to introduce the latest technical means of storage. We are doing this, but very slowly because of limited money.

The first problem is that we need to build new, better storage facilities. The old storage facilities, if we base ourselves on the current requirements of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], have become obsolete, of course. Requirements for them are rising with respect to ecological indicators. We have an agreement with the United States on construction of storage facilities, including designing them. It is true that the Americans, having appropriated 15 billion dollars for this project, took 14 million for themselves and only turned 1 million over to us. But nine-tenths of the design organizations working on this project are Russian. The Americans liked our designs. They are going to build themselves new storage capacities according to our design, because we are sharing our documentation with them.

The second problems is containers. We have an agreement with the United States on this too. We need **more than 100,000** containers. We are now manufacturing **up to 10,000 containers a year.** We have also worked out the documentation for a new type of container that meets world standards. Because we are storing radioactive

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weapons materials, the requirements are even higher. We and the Americans have coordinated these general requirements. A special group made up of Russian and American specialists reviewed the entire set of documents and selected the best design. The group unanimously decided that the Russian documentation was best. It has more lines of defense, and the design itself is original. This is what we decided: we will turn the documentation over to the Americans and they will manufacture **50,000 containers** of the 100,000 that we need. They will make containers for themselves from our documentation.

The third problem is our plants for the manufacture of fuel elements for atomic plants. Of course, the conditions for these plants are completely different than for the nuclear weapons complex. Fuel elements are a commercial product today. Naturally, the situation here must be corrected. And this refers to lightly enriched uranium (up to 20 percent for isotope 235). We make quite a bit of this uranium each year: for all our atomic power plants, for the countries of Eastern Europe, and for Finland, in other words, for those for whom we once build atomic power plants based on our designs. And operating conditions, of course, were not the same as in the nuclear weapons complex, where recordkeeping is rigorous.

But here the laws of the market come into play. **Such uranium can and must be sold. And we will give those who buy it some material free of charge, as a premium for this purchase, because it is very hard to break into this market.** For two whole years the Americans have been fighting our Tekhsnabeksport [Technical Supply Export] organization in court, accusing us of dumping-type prices, but in reality, of course, pursuing their own narrowly mercenary economic interests and trying to crush a dangerous rival.

[Orlov] But certainly, there have been cases of uranium theft: Elektrostal, Podolsk, Glazov...

[Mikhaylov] I will put it this way, the *thieves* and *buyers* are mainly provocateurs. I recently returned from Glazov, from the Chepetskiy Machine Plant, where such things occurred. They are storing hundreds of thousands of tonnes of waste in dumps there, waste from production after extraction of part of the uranium-235. Some proportion remains, and these wastes are stored. **The price of these wastes is a few dollars per kilogram on the world market.** Then suddenly mysterious people arrive and offer the workers **10, maybe 100 dollars a kilogram,** instead of 1-5. This can be tempting, naturally.

[Orlov] Who are these people you call "provocateurs," who offer 100 or 1,000 times the real value?

[Mikhaylov] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] employees. I asked the MVD minister of Udmurtia, *"Why are you doing this?* He answered, *"We need to identify possible channels."* At this I answered him, *"You understand, this is real provocation."* They have a few people under investigation now, and they will be brought to trial. These are laborers, mechanics, installation workers. They delivered sample batches and received their dollars, but they did not even make it home to share their joy before their hands were bound, the dollars confiscated, and they were put in jail. And the MVD people change clothes and receive promotions in rank. This is very troubling.

Of course, every department can have its own techniques and methods, **but not this kind!** I assembled the local community and said: *"Tell everyone that you won't even have time to go to the store and buy a bottle of vodka to wash down the deal before they confiscate all the money and arrest you."*

Incidentally, I also spoke about these *provocations* at an IAEA session. I recall how the American specialists, within the framework of our agreement on monitoring and recordkeeping of nuclear materials, looked at how we store weapons materials at Tomsk-7. They saw several lines of defense, armored personnel carriers, and a strong guard and were probably convinced that this system is dependable.

I do not disagree that the guard's technical means need to be updated. But we certainly do not need technical assistance here. We have already developed such means. We equipped the White House (the Russian Government Building on Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya in Moscow—editors) with first-class security means, and the Tretyakov Gallery too. The problem is *only* that we have no money to order these systems from our own plants.

[Orlov] Let's go back to the story of the "provocateurs." Wasn't that same method tried by the German special services in Munich in August 1994?

[Mikhaylov] Indeed. It looked like the Germans had found plutonium. It looked like it had come from Moscow. Then things became incomprehensible. The materials seized in Munich were not given to Russia for analysis. But every plant knows its own *"image,"* which is easily determined by the number of *spare* isotopes in the material. Plutonium, for example, has a large number of isotopes, as does uranium. After all, each enterprise enriches by its own system.

[Orlov] In other words, each enterprise can take "fingerprints," and then later no one will confuse its output with any other...

[Mikhaylov] Exactly. So why didn't they give the material to Russia to test, instead of sending it to the U.S. National Laboratory in Los Alamos? However, even there their answer was that it was not weapons material, but rather a mixed uranium-plutonium fuel (**MOKhtoplivo**).

Then they gave the seized material to IAEA for analysis, and the analysis showed that the material was not of Russian origin. The hullabaloo began to die down

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quickly. But what had gone on earlier? Kohl made statements and Schmidbauer came running. Perhaps this was because of their election campaign? Or there was this underlying message—to show that Russia is not able to handle its own nuclear industry complex, therefore the West must take it under control?

[Orlov] Viktor Nikitovich, isn't a more prosaic reason such as economic competition more likely?

[Mikhaylov] I do not preclude it. I have already said that there is impressive competition in the world nuclear market. Russia is moving firmly ahead in it. For example in China. But not just there, also in Europe and America. The customers like our uranium. It is both cleaner and cheaper than American uranium. We have the world's best technology for enriching it.

Finally, the time has come to say openly that the footprints of the gas-petroleum complex can be seen in the campaign against the Russian atomic industry. There is no need to say how powerful the lobbyists acting in its interests are. For example, I do not preclude the possibility that *Greenpeace* itself is partly financed by **petrodollars**. In Europe this attack is succeeding in part. Atomic power engineering continues to hold a strong position and grow stronger in Japan, North and South Korea, China, India, the Middle Eastern countries, and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The fact that these regions are inclined toward vigorous development of nuclear power engineering also annoys the petroleum and gas industry lobbyists. Aren't they the channel by which journalists receive some of the *exposes of nuclear smuggling*, which later turn out to be plain *hoaxes*?

[Orlov] Did you know about the preparations for "Operation Sapphire," to sell Kazakh uranium to the United States?

[Mikhaylov] We knew very well that the material was located in Kazakhstan. They had offered it to us at one time. But we refused because we have such material. It is basically waste from the production of fuel elements, highly enriched uranium but not of the structure and composition from which we could make something, by which I refer mainly to urano-beryl mixtures which even the Americans cannot process. But at one time we made fuel elements for our own transportation nuclear power plants, for the navy and for reactors. We know this material. The Americans suggested that we buy it and pay some 20 million dollars. But we have this material; we do not need it. Then they proposed that they buy it and store it in our country. Russia could not permit itself such a headache either. *What does it mean to store foreign material?* If it is put under an IAEA guarantee, you must have premises, equipment, and so on, in short, a real headache.

But why did the Americans conduct Operation Sapphire secretly? Were they afraid of Russia, Iran, or Iraq? That is ridiculous.

[Orlov] But after all, they often say that some Middle East regimes want to buy nuclear materials from Kazakhstan...

[Mikhaylov] *Baloney! No country can manufacture a nuclear bomb from smuggled material.* For that you need large, I would say enormous, industry. Creating a complex to extract and process material is just one-fifth of the road. There are still four fifths to go to build an atomic bomb. A country cannot become a nuclear power without the full complex.

As for the possibility of using these materials for blackmail, that is very serious and dangerous. Yet after all, you cannot help but understand that stolen nuclear material is also dangerous to the lives of those who try to make it the object of smuggling (although, of course, if this is done on a high technical level, this danger can be avoided). This is not smuggling narcotics, you know. You can put narcotics in your pocket and that's it. But here...

[Orlov] Let us return to the Kazakh-American transaction.

[Mikhaylov] It has obvious advantages for the Kazakh side. Kazakhstan sold the uranium and received a good deal of money for it. In other words, this was an ordinary commercial transaction, declared at IAEA according to all the rules. **Up to 60,000 tonnes of uranium is sold in the world each year as the result of such transactions.**

But here is what is alarming. The United States gave this everyday operation such an ostentatious name, Sapphire, and then trumpeted it all over the world, held a pompous press conference with the participation of three ministers. The ministers announced the enormous contribution which the United States, through Operation Sapphire, was making to the cause of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies.

Of course, we know how much the United States is helping Kazakhstan and Ukraine in matters of dismantling and destroying launchers and we respect this help. But it must not be forgotten that, behind the wave of propaganda, this help is a trifle compared with what Russia is doing in the same direction. For Russia the dismantling of nuclear weapons brought from Ukraine and Kazakhstan will cost roughly 2-3 billion dollars. And the Americans are giving Ukraine and Kazakhstan somewhere in the area of 100 million dollars. That is just one-tenth of Russia's expenditures. Without exaggeration, Russia's contribution to the cause of nonproliferation in the territory of the former Soviet Union is gigantic.

[Orlov] You already mentioned bilateral Russian-American agreements briefly. I would like to know your attitude toward them in more detail.

[Mikhaylov] We have signed seven agreements, based on the financing which is appropriated by the United States under the Nunn-Lugar law, a total amount of around 215

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million dollars. Personally I am only satisfied with the implementation of two of them: on containers and on designing storage capacities. The other five are going, as they say, *neither well nor badly.* Note this: it is not outright assistance from the United States. The contractors are chiefly American companies. Of course, if we are objective, the Nunn-Lugar Fund was established to help with our problems, but I repeat, all the transactions are moving very, very slowly today.

If you asked me as a scholar, not a minister, I would pose the question: was it worth signing these agreements? Wouldn't it have been better to take the route of giving Russia free entry into the world market and limit it to that, not take money under the Nunn-Lugar program? Suffice it to say that **in 1992-1994 alone we have lost almost 400 million dollars in the American market.** We are ready to go into this market with our high technologies, but then let competition show whose nuclear material is better, and let them buy the better material.

[Orlov] Since we have already touched so many times on the subject of the interrelation of nuclear power engineering and the economy, tell us how significant are the purely economic losses which we are taking (or will take) as a result of our ill-considered policy toward North Korea.

[Mikhaylov] We collaborated with the North Koreans for many years in introducing the latest technology for peaceful use of atomic energy. I must say that at one time we invested a great deal in the development of atomic power in North Korea, and at the present time that country is about 30 million dollars in debt to the Ministry of Atomic Energy.

The dialogue between North Korea and the United States is becoming active today. The United States is offering the North Koreans development of atomic energy, including light-water reactors. Russia has been left with nothing to do. It is hard to assess the economic losses, but they are highly significant.

I do not know whose fault this is. I am only giving facts. As if it is not enough that we cannot get back the money which the North Koreans owe us, on top of that we have been displaced from further projects.

[Orlov] Let's move from particular to more general questions. Information has appeared that the idea of a universal ban on all types of nuclear explosions does not suit Russia. The Russian delegation at the talks in Geneva supposedly received an order to defend the idea of continuing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

[Mikhaylov] The issue of a universal ban of nuclear testing is a very complex one. On the one hand a ban on nuclear testing is an important step toward nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, a nuclear-free world. On the other hand, though, the stockpiled nuclear arsenals demand constant maintenance, especially in the area of security. But for this, naturally, you need limited, small-scale nuclear testing. That is the military aspect.

As for the *peaceful* aspect, I can say that we have conducted 122 nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, while the Americans have conducted about 50. For now these nuclear explosions have not had a major economic impact.

At the same time, nuclear explosions can be used to create cavities for storing chemical and petroleum-gas industrial waste and radioactive waste material to minimize its negative effect on the ecological situation. On this basis I personally believe that there should not be a ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is not an issue for me.

The issue is something else: what should the control mechanism over the conduct of such nuclear explosions be? You must think of international expert studies, joint projects, and the like. The positions and interests of all the five nuclear powers are very close here; they follow from the evolution of the development of this type of weapon of mass destruction. It would be too easy to ban *everything.* Instead of this we need to decide together the questions of the mechanism of conducting these experiments and control over them.

In general I do not much believe in bans in science. Scientists will continue to work anyway, and if a plan that is in the interests of the development of all humanity appears, can it really be banned?

[Orlov] But will Russia uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing? The Chinese are continuing their blasts, and this is causing difficulties at the Geneva talks. And you yourself once said that "two or three nuclear explosions a year are simply essential for Russia."

[Mikhaylov] I do not take back those words. But I think that we must have forbearance. This is especially important on the eve of the conference to extend the Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation Treaty.

[Orlov] What do you think about the effectiveness of this treaty?

[Mikhaylov] It is extremely important today to preserve this treaty for a long time. But look what is happening. The United States appears to be fighting more vigorously than others for an open-ended extension, while the country itself is doing a great deal to harm the treaty. It is even trying to isolate whole peoples from attaining nuclear power, which directly contradicts the treaty. The text says that the nuclear countries are obligated to help the non-nuclear countries who have signed the treaty to incorporate the latest technologies for peaceful use of nuclear energy. And what kind of policy is the United States following in relation to Iran? This hardly promotes the idea of an open-ended extension of the treaty at the approaching conference, an idea which I share in full.

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Details on Nuclear Materials Theft From Navy

Investigator Critiques Security Measures

95WC0028A Moscow YADERNYY KONTROL: OBOZRENIYE PO PROBLEMAM ORUZHIYA MASSOVOGO UNICHTOZHENIYA V ROSSII I NOVYKH NEZAVISIMYKH GOSUDARSTVAKH No 2, Feb 95 [Signed to press 30 Jan 95] pp 12-13

[Article by Mikhail Kulik, investigator for especially important cases of the military procurator's office of the Northern Fleet, under the rubric "Analysis": "Exclusive: Some Problems of Storing Nuclear Materials in the Northern Fleet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In November 1994,** I finished the criminal case on the **insider theft of radioactive materials in the Northern Fleet** not far from Murmansk. What was stolen was what specialists call the **"active parts"** of three live fuel assemblies ["teplovydelyayushchaya sborka"] for nuclear reactors of atomic submarines, containing *about a kilogram* of uranium-235. The guilty parties were detained; they did not have the opportunity to sell the radioactive goods; they admitted their guilt; and the trial will take place soon... It would have seemed that I could have put an end to it and moved on to the next case. I am not certain, however, that the conviction of the three criminals will resolve those problems which the Northern Fleet faces involving the storage of radioactive materials.

What is most alarming? The arguments of politicians that insider theft, especially in Ministry of Defense storage facilities, is precluded because... it is precluded. In fact we have heard that very argument from *"force"* many times.

I will stipulate right away that I am a jurist, a practicing lawyer, and I am not too familiar with theoretical programs in the area of recordkeeping, monitoring, and safekeeping of nuclear materials. Nonetheless, a substantial amount of work experience in countering the smuggling of radioactive materials in the Northern Fleet allows me at the very least to question the complacency of military generals and the *"generals"* from Minatom [Ministry of Atomic Energy].

On the one hand, you can understand them. For cases of insider theft did not in fact occur for many years. Because of that, caution became dulled, very seriously dulled. The services which are engaged in keeping records, monitoring, and storing nuclear materials will never tell you the amount of the substance stolen to the accuracy of a kilogram. The calculation is made either in tonnes or... in rubles, and the latter is most common. Inflation makes these calculations simply absurd. And the concept of *"plus or minus a kilogram"* is elevated to a rule, at least in the Northern Fleet.

How was the storage facility where the theft was committed guarded? *On the Kolskiy Bay side, there is no protection at all: just come in by boat, especially at night, and go to it. On the Murmansk industrial zone side, there are ship repair yards and wood processing combines, in short an unprotected industrial zone.* There are breaches in the fence around. And if not, any child can shake the half-rotted boards apart. There is no control-tracking zone along the perimeter of the storage facility. It is no problem to get right to the rear door. Large pieces of equipment and nonferrous metals which will no longer be used have been stored on the territory of the warehouse and around it for many years. No one bothers even to turn it in for scrap metal. The junkiness of the territory gives criminals the impression that even the warehouse with the fuel assemblies itself is unlikely to be under reliable guard. **And this impression is not deceptive.**

The warehouse itself is equipped with antinuclear protection, that is to say, a system for monitoring a self-sustaining nuclear reaction, a fire protection system, and a water alarm (**the indicator consists of two extremely simple contacts** located at a certain level from the surface; when the water reaches that level, the contacts close and the alarm sounds).

But there is almost no protective alarm as such. There is a simple contact switch: when the door opens a pin is knocked out and the alarm sounds. The door closes, the pin goes back in place, the contact is broken, and accordingly the alarm stops sounding. This alarm is connected to a panel located 100 meters from the storage facility itself. In addition, the alarm in the storage facility has been **"short circuited"**: you open one of the doors (the front door or the back door), the other will open even without any signal. Moreover, the cable for this alarm passes through the "employees lounge," the freight handlers' dressing room. The control panel was not even locked in the "employees lounge." In other words, sitting in the "employees lounge," the criminal can take his time to disconnect the control panel and go into action.

Two old ladies, guards from VOKhR [combat security unit], sit at the control panel. But not always. In order to reach this place, they must pass through the junky territory, and in the winter through enormous snowdrifts as well. The old ladies are armed with pistols which they are afraid even to handle. There is no light. **Even potatoes are probably much better guarded today than radioactive materials.**

We certainly cannot say that there was no documentation on guarding this type of installation. Among other things, the manual on Protecting State Secrets (sometimes called simply the ZGS) was developed, introduced by order of the Russian minister of defense, and is in effect. Nonetheless, the Northern Fleet does not comply with it. In part, because of the lack of financing. And in part, because of the negligence of the command group. I have heard officers say more than once: *"We do not have that order in our hands and we are not familiar with it; why should we carry it out?"*

According to existing instructions, there should be a deadlock on the storage facility, the kind that cannot be

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sawed in half. But in practice an ordinary storehouse lock, and a rusty one, hangs on the warehouse where the theft was committed. The criminals did not need even 10 minutes to saw through it.

Allow me to note that requests for additional financing for storage of radioactive materials in the Northern Fleet, in particular financing to repair storage facilities already in existence, were sent to higher authorities throughout all of 1993. The capital was not allocated. Capital was later allocated for the Northern Fleet, but it was earmarked and spent for a different storage facility.

Repairs on the storage facility where the theft took place were done almost daily, by *"their own efforts,"* as people say. What does that mean? Boards are torn from the packing unit of a large piece of equipment and hammered onto the fence, plus a little barbed wire is added. Thus, the holes in the fence have one patch on top the other. That is all the *"improvement of the quality of protection"* there was.

As a result of the theft, the commander of the Northern Fleet was punished for complete unsuitability for his post. **But just what was changed at the storage facility itself?** The guard was increased and portable radios were issued (too heavy for women, incidentally). The command group of the Northern Fleet held a conference on the question of equipping this and one other similar storage facility with a special KhON-type alarm equipment (a space signaling system: it sounds if the free space of the room is decreased, that is, if a person enters). The money for these signaling systems has not been found either. Expenditures for them were planned for 1994, but once again the money was not allocated.

The question of reequipping the storage facility was also raised. Among other things, it was indicated that a bunker (or bunkers) must be built, a guard must be posted, and a weapons emplacement and light signaling system must be installed... Military specialists came to the conclusion that the costs were not great even on the purely financial level. But even so their recommendations were not given consideration.

Now people are saying that financing simply will not be allocated to improve storage conditions. This question in fact seems already secondary to many officers in the Northern Fleet, since sometimes wages are not paid for two months.

How checks are made to see that the fuel assemblies (STVS ["svezhaya teplovydelyayushchaya sborka"—live fuel assembly]) are present is a separate topic. **This is done chiefly on the level of inspecting the integrity of the seals.** *What is this plastic seal?* I, for example, need *about 7 minutes* to remove it and put it in place. **But nine-tenths of the containers with STVS were checked for the first and last time during loading at the plant.** Approximately once or twice a day, the storehouse chief makes a cursory check of the safekeeping of the containers: he raises the tarp and if there are no footprints and nothing is scattered about, it means everything is in order. In other words, if not for a chance event, the Murmansk theft might not have been discovered for some 10 years or even later...

Another question is whether the radioactive materials stored in the Northern Fleet are truly of high value to smugglers. Allow me to stipulate right off that this question, no matter how it is answered, *"yes"* or *"no,"* does not eliminate the need for the previous discussion.

According to the data which I have, organized crime groups are working increasingly hard to obtain substantial batches of radioactive materials from the Northern Fleet. They are setting up contacts and probing possibilities and the weakest links for large scale thefts. Some of them are even studying future ways to export the stolen materials: some—to the West, including through the Baltic countries, and others to the South, through the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

Organized groups are carefully studying which particular materials enjoy the most demand among foreign clients.

Nonetheless, those thieves whom we have encountered so far are for the most part nonprofessionals working alone. Incidentally, the concept of *"nonprofessional"* is very arbitrary. Criminals in general have an idea of what to steal and how. At the same time, however, the question of where to try to sell *it* and for what price remains an open one for them.

In the case of the Murmansk theft, a serious buyer would hardly *bite*, although during the investigation we did not rule out that he would accept the stolen STVS's as a sample. Possibly if the criminals managed to reach an understanding with an organized crime group and sell the goods to it, they would soon receive a very substantial order. It is curious that the thieves had such a one-time contact with a serious criminal group, but no concrete order was made. At that point the criminals preferred to operate on the principle: *"Let's go steal it and we will find a buyer later. If people are always talking about uranium, it means we will have no problem finding a buyer through businessmen we know."*

According to some information which I am not yet ready to confirm, the stolen uranium compound **could be used to cause harm by affecting the health of those around, even to the point of death.** *We are already familiar with cases where a batch of it was stuffed in the lining of an entrepreneur's chair and in a few months he died of cancer of the blood.* This method of using stolen radioactive material is extremely attractive to assassins, since it is extremely difficult to find clues.

Finally, let us not ignore the idea of simply crushing the stolen material and pouring it into a drinking water source or into a river for the purpose of terrorism and blackmail. A specialist is probably already prepared to argue with me that without a neutron source, there is little sense in a terrorist *dumping the material in the*

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water, since without the neutron source, the uranium compound is stable. It was no accident that the thieves kept it under a simple tarp and did not risk anything by doing so. Nonetheless, I do not rule out the possibility that when the game is for high stakes, a fast neutron source can be stolen too.

I must say directly that this particular stolen material which figured in the criminal case would hardly interest foreign clients making plans to create a full-fledged military nuclear fuel cycle in their countries. To a much greater degree, the threat to Russia's security was inflicted indirectly. Now the West has weightier reasons to accuse Russia of improperly storing nuclear materials in the Northern Fleet.

[Box]

The YaK [YADERNYY KONTROL] File

The findings of the technical expert study reveal that the object of the theft was the **active parts of three live fuel assemblies (STVS) of a VM 4-AM-type active zone.** These items are used to load into the reactor of an atomic submarine. The fuel compound of an STVS includes **1,448.9 grams of uranium-235, 234, 236, and 238, while 283.3 grams of that is uranium-235,** that is to say, about 20 percent.

The cost per item in 1986 prices totals **7,106 rubles** [R], and in 1991 prices—**R17,080.** After the theft was committed, the **items were out of commission** and unsuitable for further direct use.

According to the findings of the technical expert study, the stripped STVS could not be reconditioned, and only the fuel compound contained in them was suitable for further use. **The value of one kilogram of the compound** at the time of the theft was **R310,000.** Consequently, the residual value of the STVS consists of the value of the compound, that is to say, it comes to **R449,159.**

The telegraph message from the commander of Military Unit 72190 reveals that in order to determine the value of STVS articles in the fourth quarter of 1993, we must apply a multiplier of 10 to the 1991 price (the 1992 price), and a multiplier of 35, **that is to say, the value of the stolen items at the time the crime was committed comes to R17.934 million.** [End box]

Charges Against Perpetrators

95WC0028B Moscow YADERNYY KONTROL: OBOZRENIYE PO PROBLEMAM ORUZHIYA MASSOVOGO UNICHTOZHENIYA V ROSSII I NOVYKH NEZAVISIMYKH GOSUDARSTVAKH No 2, Feb 95 [Signed to press 30 Jan 95] pp 14-15

[Text of "Criminal Information (Fragments)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Criminal information on the charges against Captain 2d Rank **Aleksey Yuryevich Tikhomirov and civilian Oleg Mikhaylovich Baranov** of committing the crime envisioned by **articles 223-3 and 251, Point "b," of the RF Criminal Code,** as well as against Senior Lieutenant **Dmitriy Yuryevich Tikhomirov** of committing the crime envisioned by **articles 17, Part 6, and 223-3, and 17, Part 6, and 251, Point "b," of the RF Criminal Code.**

The investigation of the case established the following:

In the first days of November 1993, in the city of Polyarnyy in Murmansk Oblast, O. M. Baranov, A. Yu. Tikhomirov, and D. Yu. Tikhomirov entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit **insider theft of the radioactive materials of the active parts of three live fuel assemblies containing about 1 kilogram of uranium-235,** intending to sell them and split the money among themselves.

However, this conspiracy had existed among them in a less defined form since August 1993. In order to make it easier for A. Yu. Tikhomirov and O. M. Baranov to commit the theft, interested in the successful realization of their criminal intention, and having information which A. Yu. Tikhomirov and O. M. Baranov did not have access to; for several months, from August through mid-November 1993, in the city of Polyarnyy in Murmansk Oblast, Dmitriy Yuryevich Tikhomirov assisted them with advice and instructions after explaining that the **items** they were interested in **were stored in storage facility No 3-30 on the territory of Military Unit 31326 in the city of Murmansk; this territory was poorly guarded, and the enclosure had breaches;** and he indicated the location of these breaches. Moreover, D. Yu. Tikhomirov explained to them how the STVS was set up, what form it was stored in, and how the active and technological parts could be separated, and notified them in advance that the TVS did not represent a radiation danger and could be stored without special equipment.

With the complicity of D. Yu. Tikhomirov and fulfilling their own criminal intent, in accordance with the roles assigned, A. Yu. Tikhomirov and O. M. Baranov met in the city of Murmansk on Ushakov Street near Building No 9 on 27 November 1993 at about 0100 hours, and in the latter's personal vehicle drove to the construction site of a residential building on Nakhimov Street in the city of Murmansk, where O. M. Baranov stayed in the vehicle while A. Yu. Tikhomirov set off for technical site No 3 of Military Unit No 31326. Because D. Yu. Tikhomirov did not appear to meet him, **A. Yu. Tikhomirov entered the territory of the site through the breach in the enclosure by himself and, cutting the shackle of the hinged lock which secured the door of the back entrance to storage facility No 3-30, went inside. There he opened radiation packing unit No 23 of the complex of the VM 4-AM active zone of plant No 746.** A. Yu. Tikhomirov removed three STVS's from this packing unit and broke off the active parts, **each of which contained 283.3 grams of uranium-235 (the value of one STVS is R5.978 million),** thereby intentionally damaging military property. Next A. Yu. Tikhomirov put what he had stolen into the bag he had

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brought with him and returned to O. M. Baranov's vehicle. Together they put the stolen goods into the car's trunk, and O. M. Baranov took the active parts of the STVS's to the city of Polyarnyy where he hid them in a hiding place in his garage and kept them until they were confiscated by the investigation.

A. Yu. Tikhomirov, D. Yu. Tikhomirov, and O. M. Baranov fully confessed their guilt for the acts they were charged with and in addition gave truthful testimony on the circumstances of the commission of the crime.

Thus, under interrogation as an accused person, A. Yu. Tikhomirov explained that in July-August 1993, a conversation had taken place among him, his brother, and their common acquaintance O. M. Baranov during which O. M. Baranov **suggested the possibility of selling live nuclear fuel for submarine reactors. However, at first the decision to commit insider theft was not made. Later, when he was on the PM-78 ship which docked at the third technical site of Military Unit No 31326 where his younger brother was acting chief of the workshop for recharging reactors and saw storage facility No 3-30 in which the active zones for submarine reactors were kept, he became convinced that it was possible to commit the theft from there,** and the conversation among him, Baranov, and D. Yu. Tikhomirov was resumed. Such conversations occurred more than once throughout the fall of 1993, and by the start of November 1993 a conspiracy had emerged among these persons to commit insider theft of the active parts of three live fuel assemblies containing, in his opinion, about 1 kilogram of fuel compound.

In the process the roles in the theft were divided up in the following way: together with D. Yu. Tikhomirov, he [A. Yu. Tikhomirov] gets into the storage facility and steals the radioactive parts of the STVS's and removes them from the territory of the site. O. M. Baranov waits for them not far away with his personal vehicle and takes the thieves away from the site of the crime, hides the stolen goods at his place, and then works on selling them. In order to make it easier to commit the theft, D. Yu. Tikhomirov told his brother and O. M. Baranov what an STVS looks like, where it must be separated in order to obtain only the part which contains the fuel compound, what the danger of handling the fuel is, and how to hide it so it is completely concealed. Preparing to commit the theft, at stores in the city he acquired a flashlight, a metal hack saw, wire-cutters, and a hinged lock which he planned to use to replace the lock on the storage facility door.

In accordance with the plan they had worked out, on the night of 26 to 27 November 1993, at 0100 hours, O. M. Baranov and D. Yu. Tikhomirov were supposed to go to the city of Murmansk from the city of Polyarnyy in O. M. Baranov's car and meet on Ushakov Street near Building No 9, where A. Yu. Tikhomirov lived with O. M. Baranov. But **D. Yu. Tikhomirov did not appear** at the planned meeting with O. M. Baranov, and so he went to Murmansk alone. After they met, they together went to the building under construction on Nakhimov Street where they parked the car. He [A. Yu. Tikhomirov] went by himself toward the territory of the third technical site of Military Unit No 31326, while O. M. Baranov remained in the vehicle. Following the railroad tracks leading to 35 SRZ [Ship Repair Yard], through a breach in the enclosure he entered the territory of the site and went through the doors of the back entrance into storage facility Number 3-30. Using the hack saw he brought with him, he cut the shackle of the hinged lock which secured the door and went inside. In order to open the racks and pinions of the door, he used the fire hook from the panel that was located not far from the storage facility. Inside the premises, he went up to the nearest rack on the left and threw back the tarp. After opening the cover of the long box located in the center of the rack, he used a knife to extract one of the STVS's halfway and found the place where the active and technical parts joined. He tried to cut it with the hack saw, but after making 2-3 cuts, he twisted the STVS with his hands and broke it in half. Then he used a similar method to break off the other 2 active parts from this same box and, putting what he had stolen in his tarpaulin bag, he left the storage facility.

He returned to Baranov's vehicle by the same path and together they put what he had stolen into the trunk and together they traveled along the Murmansk-Severomorsk Highway, where they stopped at the entrance to the vehicle lot. There he threw out the hack saw, the rubber gloves in which he worked while committing the theft, and the wirecutters, while he placed the flashlight in the glove compartment inside the vehicle. After that O. M. Baranov took him back to Building No 9 on Ushakov Street, while Baranov himself went to the city of Polyarnyy. A short time later he saw the stolen STVS parts in O. M. Baranov's garage and together with O. M. Baranov took one of them apart. He did not make an attempt to sell it. Baranov did that, which is known from what the latter said. **They were figuring to receive about 50,000 U.S. dollars for the stolen STVS's.**

A. Yu. Tikhomirov completely reaffirmed his testimony during an investigative experiment done in order to verify it at the site.

O. M. Baranov gave testimony which essentially did not differ from that given by A. Yu. Tikhomirov, after specifying that the circumstances of A. Yu. Tikhomirov's direct entry into the premises of the storage facility were familiar to him from what the latter said. Moreover, during the preliminary conversations on the theft, he did mention that he could sell the stolen goods, but in fact **he did not have any channels for selling this type of item and he was merely counting on finding them later.** But after committing the theft, he did not begin to look for buyers, expecting that it would not be successful.

D. Yu. Tikhomirov also gave testimony which did not differ from the testimony of A. Yu. Tikhomirov and O.

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M. Baranov and in the process explained that he had not planned to commit the theft, although he had not said so openly. But on the night of the theft, he did not have any insurmountable obstacles preventing him from participating in committing the crime—he voluntarily refused to do so and stayed on the ship.

The negligible differences in the testimony of the accused were eliminated during the confrontation between them. In addition to personal confessions, the guilt of A. Yu. Tikhomirov, O. M. Baranov, and D. Yu. Tikhomirov for the acts they were charged with is confirmed by the evidence gathered on the case in its entirety.

Thus, during the inspection of the site of the event on 29 November 1993, it was established that storage facility No 3-30 is on the territory of the technical site of Military Unit No 31326 in the city of Murmansk. At the time of the inspection, container No 23 of the VM 4-AM active zone was in a rack near the door of the back entrance, on the left. Within the container were five live fuel assemblies; two of them were intact, while the active parts had been removed from three of them. At the time the signs of entry into the storage facility were discovered, that is to say, at 1430 hours on 27 November 1993, the hinged lock with the shackle sawed in half lay in the snow 1-1.5 meters from the corner of the storage facility near the concrete enclosure of 35 SRZ. Next to it lay the metallic fire hook painted red. According to the explanation of the participants in the experiment, this hook used to be on the fire panel not far from storage facility No 3-30. Two plastic seals with the number 55 on the housing which were joined by a wire were also found within the premises near the active zone rack. Close inspection of the remaining technological parts of the STVS's revealed that at the place which joined the active part, the STVS housing had a broken edge, the cylindrical form was impaired, and the housing was slightly flattened along the diameter. On one of the STVS's, there was a lengthwise mark of a cut by a cutting tool at the site of the break. Parts of the STVS packing, polyethylene and corrugated cardboard, were found under the tarp in the same place.

All the objects found at the site of the incident, the seals, the technological parts of the STVS's, parts of the packing, the lock, the hook, and the metallic block with an impression of the seal, were confiscated, inspected, and attached to the file as physical evidence. The findings of the criminal expert study No 741/03 dated 6 December 1993 reveal that the hinged lock removed from the site of the incident was technically repaired, but not suitable for use because the locking end of the shackle had been sawn in half. It could have been sawn when the lock was locked and hanging on the door of the storage facility. The cut was made with a hack saw with teeth separated by up to 1mm, that is to say, possibly a hack saw made of metal.

The findings of the expert study of clues No 741a/03 dated 17 December 1993 reveal that the technological parts of the TVS's presented for study had been separated from the active parts in the following way: first small cuts were made on one of the TVS's with a hack saw blade with 1 mm teeth; then it was broken apart using one of the ends as a lever. The break was accomplished by repeatedly twisting them.

(...) Witness V. I. Buzunkin testified that on 30 November 1993 at 1500 hours, he was sent to repair a break in the fence enclosing the third technical site of Military Unit 31326, and right at this break discovered two rubber gaskets from the containers with the STVS's, which he voluntarily surrendered to the investigation.

(...) Witness V. V. Malenko testified that on 29 November 1993 about 1200 hours, he was walking along the railroad tracks at the Voyentorg TZB [Directorate of Trade Establishments for Military Personnel trade and purchasing base], and not far from a break in the enclosure of the third technical site of Military Unit 31326, he found 3-4 rubber gaskets similar to those which were found by witness V. I. Buzunkin.

(...) Witness S. Ye. Parolov testified that **on 20 June 1994 while drinking alcohol at his home, D. Yu. Tikhomirov asked whether he could help sell some sort of metal.** But he did not attach any significance to this conversation. On 24 June 1994, D. Yu. Tikhomirov again came to him and announced that he and his brother were the ones who had stolen STVS's from storage facility No 3-30 and asked for help in selling these goods. He reported this to Captain 3d Rank G. A. Kalinkin.

At the supplemental interrogation as an accused person, D. Yu. Tikhomirov explained that he had talked about this with S. Ye. Parolov, but did not mean that he had stolen the STVS's, but only that he knew of the commission of this theft by A. Yu. Tikhomirov and O. M. Baranov. He also explained that he had in fact proposed that Parolov provide help in selling what had been stolen.

Witness G. A. Kalinkin explained that on 28 June 1994, Senior Lieutenant S. Ye. Parolov had in fact come to his cabin in the PM-12 ship and told him the substance of his conversation with D. Yu. Tikhomirov concerning the theft of the STVS's. Moreover, Parolov reported that according to D. Yu. Tikhomirov, the stolen goods had been hidden in the garage of civilian O. M. Baranov in the city of Polyarnyy. He immediately reported these facts to the RF FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] OVKR [possibly military counterintelligence department].

Witness L. Z. Sumskaya testified that at 1000 hours on 27 November 1993, she relieved the chief of the VOKhR guard at the third technical site of Military Unit 31326. About 1400 hours, she along with VOKhR rifleman A. S. Laysheva walked around the territory of the third site and, passing by the back entrance to storage facility No 3-30, discovered that the door of the back entrance was open and the hinged lock with the shackle sawn in half

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lay in the snow 1.5 meters from the door, and next to it lay the block with the imprint of the seal from this door and the red fire hook. They informed the duty officer for Military Unit 31326 of what they had discovered.

(...) Witness Yu. S. Barabanov explained that on 27 November 1993, he was serving as assistant duty officer for Military Unit 31326 along with the duty officer Warrant Officer ["michman"] Tkach. When the latter was at lunch, about 1415 hours a phone call came from VOKhR guard Sumskaya at the third technical site, and she reported that the lock and seal were missing from the door of the back entrance to storage facility No 3-30. He informed the commander of the unit Shanikov and the duty officer for the unit of this.

(...) Witness V. V. Tkach testified that on 27 November 1993, he was serving as duty officer for Military Unit 31326 along with assistant duty officer Barabanov. About 1330 on that day, he went home for lunch. In a short time he received a phone call from Barabanov, who reported that the door of warehouse No 3-30 was open. He summoned the chief of the storage facility, Warrant Officer ["praporshchik"] Stakhornyy, and with him and Sumskaya walked through the storage facility and discovered the same thing that Sumskaya had on her first inspection.

(...) Witness V. N. Shanikov, commander of Military Unit 31326, testified that active zones for nuclear reactors of atomic submarines are stored in storage facility No 3-30 of the technical site under his command. This storage facility is equipped with special alarm equipment and lighting. On 27 November 1993 at 1600 hours, the duty officer for the unit called him at home and reported the discovery of evidence of entry into the premises of this storage facility. He went to the scene of the incident himself and was convinced that the premises had in fact been entered, and after that ordered an inventory of the storage facility during which the theft of the active parts of 3 STVS's was discovered (...)

Aleksey Yuryevich Tikhomirov is described positively by the command as an efficient, dependable, disciplined officer. Has no penalties or commendations. Has not been brought to criminal responsibility.

Dmitriy Yuryevich Tikhomirov has been described negatively as inefficient, undependable, and undisciplined. Does not have any commendations but has five disciplinary penalties during his period of service from 1992 through 1994. Has not been brought to criminal responsibility before.

Oleg Mikhaylovich Baranov earlier served in the post of chief of the design bureau of 10 SRZ in the rank of Captain 3d Rank. At this time he has been discharged into the reserves and is temporarily unemployed. At his last place of service, he was described positively as a competent, efficient, dependable, and disciplined officer. Has not been brought to criminal responsibility.

Sincere repentance and their help in ascertaining the truth in the case are circumstances mitigating the guilt of A. Yu. Tikhomirov, D. Yu. Tikhomirov, and O. M. Baranov. Circumstances aggravating their guilt have not been established.

Criminal information compiled in the city of Severomorsk, Murmansk Oblast.

General Filatov LDPR Press Secretary

954F1515D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 95 pp 1,2

[Article by Igor Chernyak: "On General Filatov, Now Press Secretary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lately military men have come to fill the cohort of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's supporters with increasing frequency. Not that long ago, for instance, the press service of the LDPR (Russian Liberal Democratic Party) faction in the State Duma was taken over by Major General Viktor Filatov, who is rather well known for his radical national-patriotic views.

Let me remind you: At the dawn of Gorbachev's perestroyka, Colonel Filatov was one of the leading political writers for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Moreover, unlike many, he wrote without looking over his shoulder at Old Square, frequently provoking considerable consternation. (Suffice it to recall his articles documenting the fact that General Vlasov had been promoted by Zhukov, which ran counter to the official viewpoint.) However, the spirit of Filatov's publications suited the then Soviet defense minister, Marshal Yazov, who made the journalist into a general, placing him at the head of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

The period of Filatov's activities that comes to mind above all is the prolonged and bitter war between the publication he headed up and Vitaliy Korotich's OGONEK. The general fought just as tirelessly with several others, including the editor of the journal ARMIYA (formerly KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL), Koshelev, who received several dozen orders and medals for his work in the GlavPUR (Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy) and with the coming of perestroyka began working like hell to shore up the Communist regime. It should be recognized that Filatov's militant position and his numerous unmaskings met with understanding and support among a significant portion of the officers and generals, GRU associates actively supplied him with information, which could not help but put the democratic camp on its guard. So it is logical that soon after Yazov's removal it was Filatov's turn. Serving as grounds was his decision to begin publishing Hitler's MEIN KAMPF in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. Marshal Shaposhnikov's order to dismiss Filatov was read to him personally by the head of the General Staff, Army General Lobov. It is notable that in Filatov's three years

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as editor, the circulation of the god-forsaken VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL increased by a factor of nearly 15—from 27,000 to 375,000 copies.

After Viktor Filatov's removal, he edited the Interior Affairs Ministry's newspaper, SITUATSIYA, a supplement to its magazine NA BOYEVOM POSTU. He also began to publish regularly in the newspaper DEN (ZAVTRA), where he was allotted a special "general's column." He was also, in fact, the most merciless critic of Pavel Grachev. (It was Filatov who dubbed the defense minister "Pasha Mercedes," which became popular and received broad circulation). Second in Filatov's heart after Grachev stood presidential military adviser General Volkogonov. It is curious that Filatov was ruined not even by his collaboration with DEN, at whose direction the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) still turned a blind eye, but his active work in support of the Serbs in Bosnia. People talked about Filatov's leadership in forming Russian volunteer detachments and about his participation in military actions on the Serb side. Russian and foreign special services established open surveillance of the MVD newspaper's editor. However, Yerin's order about the general-journalist's retirement followed only after the opposition in Belgrade sent a letter to Yeltsin personally accusing Filatov of interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

The fact that as a result Filatov and his connections in the Defense Ministry, General Staff, and MVD wound up in the camp of the Liberal Democrats probably makes sense. I personally have not been able to understand just one thing: how his decision to serve Zhirinovskiy meshes with the fact that the latter today is one of the most consistent supporters of Filatov's accursed enemies, Yeltsin and Grachev?

"I came to Zhirinovskiy because I do not see any other political figure today in Russia who could courageously defend the Russian idea," replied the general. "As for our so-called support of Yeltsin, well, today it is not Zhirinovskiy supporting Yeltsin but Yeltsin Zhirinovskiy, who, unlike the current president, government, and the rest, has never faltered and never swerved but moved forward like a tank. I assure you, when Zhirinovskiy becomes president, this will be a very different country."

Aims, Organization of 'National Bolshevik' Party

954F1515C Moscow LIMONKA in Russian No 2, Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Eduard Limonov, chairman of National Bolshevik Party, under the rubric "Party Building": "Would You Like To Organize a Branch of the National Bolshevik Party in Your Own City (Village, Enterprise)? What Is To Be Done and How: Instructions"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Ideology

The ideology of national bolshevism is based on a clear principle: the RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, or rather, two revolutions in one: national revolution and social revolution.

1. National revolution has as its goal the establishment of the power of RUSSIANS in RUSSIA, its transformation from a country colonized by the West, as well as by the East and South, into a proud and independent Russian state. That is, to implement ethnic justice. The majority (87 percent)—the Russians—will finally be the masters in their own country. (Mechanically cut off from the "republics," Russia today is essentially an amputated USSR but not a Russian state.)

2. Social revolution has as its goal the establishment in the country of property and economic justice, which will be carried out in the interests of the majority of citizens and will be directed against the proprietor class—the overwhelming minority, which in recent years has snatched up all of Russia's wealth. The coming of a new social order through REVOLUTION is inevitable: the Russian order, where social justice inside the nation will be the law.

Thus, the goals of the NATIONAL BOLSHEVIK PARTY (NBP) are a Russian national revolution and the construction of a just Russian society—a RUSSIAN ORDER.

What Is To Be Done

Gather around you a group of capable and reliable lads (school friends, comrades from work, and so on)—the future "commissars." It is essential to have a contact telephone that can be used to get in touch instantly. Establish your link with the NBP Center in Moscow, from which you will receive directives, propaganda literature, and the NBP Charter. Send to our address (Moscow 103051, Box 151):

1. A list of your comrades—the initiators in the creation of the NBP regional branch—and a clearly filled out "Form No. 1" (Form No. 1 is given out along with the instructions—a separate sheet).

2. Minutes of the founding conference of the regional branch: a) the resolution on the creation of the regional branch; b) the discussion of the charter; c) elections for the leading organs; d) the choice of delegates for the Russia-wide constituent assembly in Moscow.

(The procedure is revolting but absolutely essential. It legalizes NBP for participation in the elections. If you find compiling the minutes too revolting, just send in your Form No. 1. We will write up minutes for you.)

Once the lads have been selected, they must immediately be divided up into "commissars," who are capable of conducting work in propaganda and agitation and of speaking in front of the masses (talking the masses senseless), and soldiers. The soldier's duty is honorable,

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but at this stage of the struggle the "commissars" are more important for us—the sowers of our ideology, developed and educated lads.

The organization's structure must be copied from the army's. An NBP section is 11-15 men, a platoon is three sections, and a company is three platoons. Should the need arise, sections from one region can be combined into one platoon or company (in conformity with the number of NBP members). The commander of such a combined detachment (column) shall be appointed by the Center.

Following directions from the NBP center in Moscow, regional sections shall participate in all campaigns initiated by the party (for example, the campaign to struggle against foreign influence in Russia) and take the measures recommended by the party, without forgetting, though, about its own initiative. (Don't forget about the Criminal Code, though, lads!)

Work broadcasting our ideology is extremely important and is the party's main work. You must remember this. Some parties and groups get carried away with training their "fighters," trips to the shooting range, and other important but not primary activities. I would point out that no amount of target practice will make hundred-percent soldiers out of "fighters." (Only service in a battle situation can do that. A well-trained army detachment can easily inflict enormous losses on amateur "fighters." Remember Vityaz, which laid low a hundred patriots at Ostankino.) Ideas possess the power of cannons; they bring down and create states; they attract military units to their side. So the tasks set before each branch of the party are arrayed by degree of importance as follows: 1) the creation of the structure of a disciplined party: 2) propaganda and agitation, the broadcasting of ideology; 3) military and physical training.

REMEMBER: Work broadcasting ideology must be purposeful. Target young people! You couldn't agitate the entire nation even if you had decades. We need a few million active young Russians, no more! But we need them immediately.

Discipline

Discipline and subordination to the party's commanders are the most important condition of victory. I have had occasion to witness dead drunk young "communists" and similarly incapacitated self-styled "fascists" at various demonstrations. These people are neither communists nor fascists—they're drunkards, broken down alcoholics. These people are harmful. At the front, those kind demoralize the detachment, and they have to be shot after the first battle. A National Bolshevik is an evil and cheerful muscleman, an athlete, a healthy spirit in a healthy body. He trains himself not to sit around in a basement but for political struggle in all its forms—intellectual as well as physical.

Initiative

Sitting on your butt and lazily cursing the authorities or the Yankees or the Zionists is both impermissible and shameful. Every local NBP organization must react instantaneously both to the orders from the NBP Center and to the changing political situation locally. Tactics must be flexible and must change frequently. Mark out your political enemies in your city, village, or region, and give them no peace, attack them in every way possible.

NBP Allies

Barshakov's RNE, Anpilov's extreme communists (Labor Russia), the revolutionary trade unions, the rockers and anarchists, all enemies of the System, all whose goals are social and national justice by means of RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.

NBP Social Base

This consists of socially dissatisfied young people (beginning with teenagers), those boys and girls who have national pride, heroic ambitions, and a desire to rise from the bottom of society to its heights. Young workers not burned out by vodka and indifference are our kind of men. Young officers are our support in the army. We call on all evil, willful, cheerful, and active young people: anarchists, fascists, rockers, businessmen, and those sitting depressed in their tents, too. The National Bolshevik Party promises you, boys and girls, a life full of heroism and adventures, sacrifice, a proud and strong life and a heroic death. Right now, lost in the villages and cities of Russia, lonely, you are nothing, you are living your own petty lives. The NBP will give your lives meaning and a high place in the society we will create. You will be the elite of the New Russia.

The NBP Uniform

It is desirable to wear black and to shave your head (or wear a Mohawk, if you like).

NBP Symbols

The banner is red with a white circle in the middle, and in the middle of the white circle is a big black hammer and sickle.

[Signed] NBP Chairman Eduard Limonov

MGU Students Joint 'National Front'

954F1515B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 11, 12-19 Feb 95 p 11

[Article by Sergey Polivanov and Igor Kosykh, under the rubric "Dossier": "Brown Party Has No One To Call Its Own"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recently arisen party called the National Front (PNF) is a pygmy, and its popularity is not at issue. What is notable, however, is that it has spread somewhat among young people and students, and its leader, Ilya Lazarenko, was given an opportunity to propagate his frankly fascist views in a seminar held

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within the walls of Moscow State University (MGU) late last year (see "Brown Seminar at MGU," MN, No 66, 1994).

[Caption, p 11] Ilya Lazarenko (center) outside the South African Embassy, 22 March 1994. Slogan: "Let us defend the white minority!"

It is young people, students, who took part in the scandalous actions carried out by "Lazarenko's people."

What attracted these "young people"?

Organization

The National Front Party was created in September 1994 at a secret conference in Moscow. Several members of Russian National Unity and the National-Social Union, who have quit the ranks of their own organizations, have joined the party, which has many "skinheads"—young people eager for decisive actions, almost all of them less than 23 years old.

The recognized leader of the PNF is Ilya Lazarenko. Unlike Barkashov and other political figures of this type, he has no official biography. It is known that he was born in 1969 in Moscow to a well-to-do family. At the present time he is a student at MGU Law School. The party is headed up by a central committee (TsK). The first secretary of the TsK is Ilya Lazarenko; the second is the militant nationalist Yuriy Bekhchanov; and the third is Dmitriy Zhukov, chairman of Sun of the North, a historical-religious association.

The party has no special detachments of fighters. It is assumed that in the case of necessity any party member could fill the functions of fighter. According to certain information, from time to time party members engage in target practice and train in hand-to-hand combat.

Program

The goal of the PNF is to overthrow "through national revolution the current liberal-democratic regime," which is "the regime of direct agents of the influence of the new Zionist-American world order, that is, the secret world Masonic government." The party does not accept the market, privatization, or private property. These principles are considered "destructive and Masonic," inasmuch as they "create the property owner as an instrument of civil, liberal society."

As for the party's economic program, Lazarenko himself at an MGU seminar in late 1994 expressed himself as follows: "We must understand clearly that in the end we will inevitably arrive at the state sector controlling the economy. . . . This will not be soon, however, so should an entrepreneur break loose from national interests or contradict them, he will get it good a good knock on the head the first time, and the third time he will be shot. . . . A specific percentage of shares will be assigned to the labor collective, that, is the collective will participate in the income."

The PNF manifesto reads somewhat differently, however: "We declare that the idea of destroying private property and total equality is the product of a non-Aryan mentality. . . . The nation-state will have to attract and develop private initiative and channel it in the interest of the Nation." The contradiction between what was said at MGU and what is written in the manifesto indicates either the populist-publicity nature of the manifesto or else that what was said at MGU is the product of a "non-Aryan mentality."

Social Support

Here is what Lazarenko thinks about this: "In the social respect, we are oriented toward all strata of society, but it works out that our main emphasis is on small property owners, that is on those who were once called kulaks, shopkeepers, here. Shopkeepers, kulaks—this is the healthiest foundation for any nation. The shopkeeper and the kulak are the most normal revolutionary Aryan element. Right now workers as a class are a herd of cattle, and it is useless for us to orient ourselves toward the working class. I call on everyone to abandon these illusions. We must orient ourselves toward quite specific strata. This means, first of all, the young people, who are "still socially undefined, and, secondly, the petty bourgeoisie."

The State

The PNF is oriented toward a so-called national corporate state that bases itself on "national-race solidarity, corporate unity, and leaders' personal responsibility." Lazarenko clarifies: "Our state will undoubtedly be leader-centric." The head of state must become the Supreme Leader, and local leaders must be in charge of affairs locally. In order to monitor these leaders' work, two-chamber national councils will be created in the center and locally; moreover, the upper house will consist of representatives of all oblasts of Russia. Who becomes such a representative will be decided by the same leaders, and it is clear that the leaders will put in those people who will "screen" them reliably. Chosen for the lower house will be representatives from corporations. All state workers must belong to Lazarenko's party. Representatives of the "political and genetic opposition" must be physically destroyed. According to some calculations, this amounts to at least 10 percent of Russia's population.

Racial Policy

Lazarenko defines this as follows: "The whites are the masters, the blacks are the slaves, and the yellows are the servants." Lazarenko believes that all nations inside the white race are equal, although at this moment only the Russians are capable of ridding all the other white peoples from "Zionist Masonry." Lazarenko considers "world Jewry" to be the Russian nation's chief enemy. As the criterion of race purity Lazarenko has chosen the phenotype, the outward signs of which, in his opinion,

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are determined "mathematically," in numbers. Lazarenko allows for the creation of autonomies in Russia for non-Aryan peoples and gives preference to the national-proportional principle of representation in the organs of power, thus defining the main principle of national construction: "We are opposed to the mixing of races, peoples, and cultures." On the subject of the war in Chechnya, members of the PNF movement state: "We need the Chechen territory but in no case do we need the Chechens."

Authorities

The party's ideologues consider Konstantin Leontyev, Konstantin Rodzayevskiy (the leader of the Russian fascists in Manchuria), and Iosif Stalin to be their spiritual predecessors. They respect Stalin for his actual rout of the Bolshevik party and destruction of communism in Russia, the creation of the traditional empire (albeit concealed by pseudo-Marxist phraseology from the time being), the restoration of state chauvinism, and anti-Semitism. The militants of the National Front are convinced that Iosif Vissarionovich was getting ready to thrust aside the "Marxist-Leninist" smokescreen and restore natural autocracy in the country.

The PNF admires Hitler as well, especially for his domestic policy, and believes that Germany and Russia were incited by "world Zionist-Masonry." PNF ideologues willingly refer to the views of Lev Gumilev, who "designated as ethnic chimeras the seizure and enslavement of great nations by small nations" by means of penetration and mixing. Citing Gumilev, one PNF activist tried to prove to us that there had never been any Mongol-Tatar yoke in old Russia at all, that there had only been a Jewish yoke, the occupation of the country by Jews from Khazar khanate.

Jews evoke special hatred from the PNF.

Propaganda

The party's organ is considered to be the newspaper NARODNYY STROY, which replaced the national-revolutionary action front's newspaper Our March, which was banned in October 1993. In early 1994, the first and as yet sole issue of NARODNYY STROY came out; further publication of the newspaper is being put off due to financial difficulties.

For the time being two party documents are available, the "Manifesto" and "Political Principles" (both dated October 1994).

Neighbors

The National Front is in conflict with Russian National Unity. Here Barshakov is considered a "pro-Zionist element who has sold out to Yeltsin's Masonic clique" because he supported Yeltsin over Chechnya. They detest Zhirinovskiy and the LDPR (Russian Liberal Democratic Party), calling Vladimir Volfovich a "Yid provocateur and Mossad agent." They consider Dmitriy Vasilyev a driveling liberal as well. They are more amicable toward certain "patriotic Communists"—Anpilov's group and Viktor Fedosov's Union of Soviet Stalinists.

The party doesn't really have anyone to call its own.

Church Affairs

The movement is a fanatic adherent of authoritarian Orthodoxy. Most of the current high church hierarchs are declared to be "conveyors of the policy of the Mason-Democrats." They respect Metropolitan Ioann and the Old Belief, viewing the church schism of the seventeenth century an "act provoked by the Zionists in order to weaken Russia." Its attitude toward Catholicism and Protestantism is guarded, and the feeling is that their influence should be severely limited. In "future Russia," non-Christian confessions will be subject to a categorical ban.

Scandals

Last March, Lazarenko, together with the Right Radical Party, held a theatricalized meeting outside the windows of the South African embassy, protesting the participation of South Africa's black population in parliamentary elections. The meeting's slogan was "Let us defend the oppressed white minority in South Africa."

The National Front regularly participates in meetings and picketing over the war in Chechnya. At a meeting on 22 January 1995, Lazarenko declared significantly: "There is no Chechen question, there is only the Russian answer to all questions!"

When Lazarenko began to plan for a meeting and march on 8 November 1994, on the occasion of the seventy-first anniversary of Hitler's 1923 "beer hall putsch," and his party put up posters downtown with an invitation to this undertaking (the poster read: "Will, blood, nation," and "The nation above all"), they were prohibited from holding this meeting.

Forecast

Today the PNF is definitely one of the most aggressive organizations in Russia. Its activities are directed against peace and tranquility in Russia and the world. The party's manifesto proclaims: "We openly welcome a progressive political crisis in Russia and plan to facilitate its development and further transformation by all means available to us."

Media Issues

Tretyakov on SEGODNYA-Most Connections

954F1515A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Volodya, Get Rid of the Lackeys! Letter to Mr. Gusinskiy in London and Partly to Mr. Loshak in Moscow""]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Up until now, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has unquestionably fallen into the category of newspapers that have not printed defamatory denunciations against colleagues. This Wednesday, with the help of Aleksandr Bekker, who once worked at MN and now works at the newspaper SEGODNYA, this barrier has unfortunately been removed.

On principle, NG does not get involved in colleagues' affairs, especially their financial affairs, although naturally it knows a great deal. It does not even publish hints about who is feeding and who is living off whom. It does not tell others how or what to write. Especially since lately in Moscow one publication has been working productively on this level, a publication which, by the way, let those who gave space to Mr. Bekker's outpourings have it.

The first paragraph is an explanation to readers that although Mr. Bekker is working for SEGODNYA, but almost never sees Vladimir Gusinskiy, at the request of Most did not write anything. In general, he considers himself an "independent journalist." True, he does call Mr. Gusinskiy his "boss," but that is obviously a slip of the tongue.

Furthermore, having discussed his honesty and disinterest, Mr. Bekker sets about unmasking so much Mr. Korzhakov as NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. He begins in the classic way for a SEGODNYA newspaperman: "He [Korzhakov] began at NG, which is not first in circulation and is apparently experiencing material difficulties, due to which the better half of the editorial staff eventually left for SEGODNYA."

The self-testimonial of "better" with the exaggeration "half" are favorite theses of certain SEGODNYA associates, which they have been repeating for a good two years. Just like their version of the reasons behind the departure. We will be simpler, though, Mr. Bekker, especially since you did not move from NG: most of the "half" were lured away for 5-10 times the salary. This concerns the issue of better and worse. We won't go into details. Given this kind of candor, you might divulge your salary at SEGODNYA and I the salary of an economic correspondent for NG (together with fee)—200,000-250,000. By the way, even now, NG's circulation, which has been specially limited "apparently due to difficulties," is not much less than SEGODNYA's real circulation.

Unlike Mr. Bekker, I have met with Mr. Gusinskiy more than once, and last May—at his initiative—we "revived our friendship," as he expressed it.

It is out of friendship that I address you, Volodya. Get rid of your lackeys. We could have had much of interest to talk about if we had met, as you pointed out, two weeks ago in London, where you had planned to fly to see me for the day from Davos (and my trip to London was postponed). I would have told you how one interesting group of analysis characterizes your relations with NG: "NG is attempting to distance itself from the Most group, although it is not hostile to it." It seems that in Davos you set forth several theses to my boss, and then Mr. Bekker, whom you never laid eyes on in your life, retold them to you one by one—exaggerating like a lackey, naturally.

And for Viktor Loshak. Viktor, given that kind of friendship between NG and Korzhakov, why is it that in two years we have never been taken along with the president's press corps? Our colleagues from MN have, but we haven't.

After all, it's true, Sasha Bekker is a quiet intellectual (who was once at MN). And see how he's grown up. On the aluminum topic. Like several others at SEGODNYA, he too, evidently, is soon going to call for crushing the Chechens with tanks.

Regional Affairs

Decree, Commentary on Development Program for Sakha

954E0596A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 14

[Text of decree, with commentary by Aleksandr Linkov: "Sakha: Second Youth. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 February 1995, No. 115, Moscow, 'On a Program of Socio-Economic Development for the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In compliance with the edict of the president of the Russian Federation of 18 August 1993, No. 1249, "On Priority Measures To Implement the Federative Agreement in the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)" (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1993, No. 34, p. 3195), the Government of the Russian Federation decrees the following:

1. To approve the Federal Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) (hereinafter referred to as the Program) submitted by the government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), the RF Ministry of Economics, and the administration board of the Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), and coordinated with the concerned federal organs of executive power.

2. The Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) and the concerned federal organs of executive power shall ensure implementation of the Program, taking into account the recommendations of the Expert Council of the Government of the Russian Federation, and guided by decrees of the Russian Federation Government No. 244, of 29 March 1994, "On approval of the Status of Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) and the Statute on Administration of the Program," and No. 243, of 29 March 1994, "On

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Setting Up the Closed Type Stock Company 'Implementation Fund For the Program of Socio-Economic Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)'" (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1994, No. 15, pp. 1228 and 1227).

3. The RF Ministry of Economics, RF Ministry of Finance, concerned federal organs of executive power, and the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) shall:

provide, when executing the Federal Budget and republican budget of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) in 1995, and in drafts of those budgets and nonbudget funds for subsequent years, funding for expenditures in the framework of investment programs to implement the Program;

prepare, within 2 months, proposals for raising additional funds from other sources of financing to implement the Program.

4. The RF Ministry of Finance shall, pursuant to the edict of the president of the Russian Federation of 18 August 1993, No. 1249, "On Priority Measures to Implement the Federative Agreement with the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)," and in accordance with established procedures, direct moneys from export and import duties paid by enterprises of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) to a special account and use those funds to finance, within the limits approved in the Federal Budget, the share of the Russian Federation's participation in the implementation of specific projects of the Program.

5. The Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) shall, jointly with the RF Ministry of Economics, the RF Ministry of Finance, the RF State Committee on the Administration of State Property, the RF Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other concerned federal organs of executive power, within 2 months prepare and present to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals for attracting funds of foreign investors to finance Program projects.

6. When formulating annual budgets of the RF Federal Road Fund, the RF Ministry of Transportation, and the RF Ministry of Finance shall provide for the allocation of funds for reconstructing the Yakutsk-Never ("Lena") and Yakutsk-Kyubyume ("Kolyma") motor roads to the extent provided for in the Federal target program "Russian Roads" for improving and developing motor roads of the Russian Federation for the years 1995-2000, and also allocations for the development of the network of territorial motor roads for general use.

7. Implementation of this decree shall be supervised by the Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) and the RF Ministry of Economics. A report on progress in implementing the Program shall be submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation annually by February 15.

[signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation

Postscript to the Document

The Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) occupies a territory of more than three million square kilometers. It is not only the largest regions of Russia in size, but also one of the richest in natural resources. They include gold, diamonds, oil, and much more. It would seem that there is everything for the prosperous existence and development of Yakutiya. But actually that is far from the case.

"The economic crisis that has now afflicted Russia has sharply revealed the highly acute socio-economic and ecological problems that have accumulated in the republic over many years," says Kliment Ivanov, permanent representative of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) to the Russian President. "They were caused primarily by the lopsided orientation of the region's economic development and the intensive exploitation of our natural wealth. The interests of the indigenous peoples of Yakutiya were simply ignored. The program approved by the Russian government is designed to start correcting past mistakes. In the first place, it is necessary to resolve urgent questions: jump-starting economic and investment activity, preventing the further decline of production, and precluding mass bankruptcy of enterprises. Then we will proceed with implementing long-term plans."

The goals are significant. Primary efforts will be directed at establishing and developing diamond processing, oil producing, gas and oil processing, and other modern, highly efficient facilities, expanding the economy's export potential, and consolidating capacities for processing agricultural produce. Steps will be taken to develop droving horse-breeding, northern reindeer breeding, fur and pelt production, and other traditional pursuits of Northern peoples.

"Thus, by establishing modern gas and oil processing facilities," Kliment Ivanov cited as one example, "we will fully meet the republic's oil requirements. And in future we will provide gas for export. I draw attention to one more feature: the program has federal status. This means that its implementation will make it possible to strengthen the economy of not only the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), but also of the Far-East region and the entire Russian Federation as a whole."

Practical implementation of the program will be governed by a specially established administration. Its board is headed by V. Shtyrov, vice-president of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), while help on the part of the Federal authorities will be provided by A. Shapovalyants, first deputy minister of economics.

Deputy Transport Minister on Cargo Flights to Groznyy

954E0596B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with transportation officials by Ruslan Ignatyev, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA political commentator:

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"Groznyy Airlifts Carry Huge Loads, Though the Main Airport Has Long Been Destroyed"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **All kinds of cargo are delivered every day to the Chechen Republic from different parts of Russia and from abroad, and teams of builders and workers, ministry and department executives and representatives are arriving: restoration of Chechnya's economy continues. The main burden in this connection has fallen on aviators. How air traffic to Groznyy is currently handled was the topic of an interview by Ruslan Ignatyev, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA political commentator, with transportion department leadership. Vadim Zamotin, deputy minister of transportion of the Russian federation, director of the air transport department:**

"The airport was one of the first targets to be knocked out during the armed conflict. The air terminal was shattered, the tower was destroyed, the fuel and lubricants depot was blown up, the buildings which housed the ground maintenance services are in ruins, all the specialized equipment is broken, and other equipment is also unusable. The runway was seriously damaged.

"Groznyy airport had a sizable airplane fleet: seven Tu-134 planes and around 20 An-2 aircraft. Some of the planes were destroyed, others, according to our information, are abroad, and those that remain are inoperable. Jokhar Dudyev's personal airplane (a Tu-134) is currently parked in one of the hangers. The liner has bullet holes in many places, the airframe is damaged. It cannot be flown. Motor vehicles used in different services have been burned.

"Frankly speaking, it will take very much time to restore all this. It is easier and faster to build anew than, for example, to repair destroyed structures. Direct shell hits have destroyed ceilings and outer walls. Fighting also took place inside buildings.

"Of course, we will have to solve all these issues. Gennadiy Anatolyevich Kruglikov, chief of the regional civil aviation directorate, has been appointed to head the airport restoration work. He is already in Chechnya and actively cooperating with local authorities.

"The necessary volume of work has already been determined, a contract has been signed with Transstroy [transport construction agency] organizations, a list of necessary equipment for ground services and air traffic control has been drawn up. Power, heating and water mains have been hooked up. Although there are still no machines and air traffic has not been restored, hiring and identification of personnel has begun. Crews are being formed and specialists are being hired, since many airmen have left the republic. True, at present aviation personnel will have to take part in repair and construction work.

"Passenger and cargo plains headed for the Chechen Republic from different parts of the country and from abroad are landing mainly at nearby airports in Vladikavkaz, Makhachkala and Mozdok. Recently air traffic to Nazran was opened.

"These days Groznyy's Severnyy [Northern] Airport is operating on an interim schedule. Planes and helicopters are ferrying in executives and representatives of different Russian ministries and departments for restoration work. All civilian planes land only with the permission of the military. They also currently handle air traffic control in Groznyy.

"Severnyy Airport will be able to start routine operations only in mid 1995. Very soon we will, apparently, start looking for ways to provide the republic's airport with planes."

As Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Yefanov, commander-in-chief of Military Transport Aviation of the Russian Defense Ministry, informed the editors, military aircraft are regularly delivering to this region humanitarian cargoes and everything necessary for the units carrying out their mission.

Directive Sets Up Center for Current Information on Chechnya

954E0596C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 14

[Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 February 1995, No. 172-p: "On-Line Information Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purpose of providing citizens of the Russian Federation with objective and timely information about events in the Chechen Republic and ensuring the necessary conditions for the professional activities of representatives of the mass media, and in view of the establishment of the On-Line Information Bureau in the Press Service of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Mobile Information Center under the Territorial Administration of Federal Organs of Executive Power in the Chechen Republic:

1. To accept the proposal of the Press Service of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Territorial Administration of Federal Organs of Executive Power in the Chechen Republic to appoint Yevgeniy Viktorovich Ivanov manager of the Mobile Information Center under the Territorial Administration of Federal Organs of Executive Power in the Chechen Republic, with the rank of deputy manager of that Territorial Administration.

2. The Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian FSK [Federal Counter-Intelligence Service], Russian FPS [Federal Frontier Service], Russian MChS [Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Eliminating the

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Consequences of Natural Calamities], and FAPSI [Federal Government Communications and Information Service] shall within three days assign one official each for work in the On-Line Information Bureau and Mobile Information Center of the RF government Press Service.

3. The Chief of the RF Government Administration shall provide accommodation for the On-Line Information Bureau in the RF Government House and handle questions of its organizational and technical support.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

Cooperation Between Dudayev, Latvian Special Services Confirmed

954F1453A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Stepan Dvornikov, under "Mutual Understanding" rubric: "Documents Discovered on Cooperation Between Chechnya and Latvian Special Services: Internal Affairs Ministers of the Two Republics Maintained Friendly Relations Since Summer, 1992"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the end of the military resistance in Chechnya grows near, new documents are falling into the hands of federal troops all the time that disclose formerly unknown aspects of cooperation between Dudayev's regime and various structures, including some along the lines of foreign special services.

Specifically, it has been established that back in summer of 1992, Mr. Chevers, the Latvian Republic's minister of internal affairs, invited his Chechen colleague to vacation at Yurmala. Here, at an MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] sanatorium on the shores of the Baltic Sea, the two ministers conducted negotiations, with the participation of Andris Staris, Latvian MVD state secretary, and Yuris Yasinkevich, chief of Interpol's Latvian Bureau. An agreement was reached, according to which the two special services would actively cooperate and exchange information about their common enemy. They informed Ivar Godmanis, former prime minister, about the results of the meeting.

After the successful negotiations, in evasion of the republic's internal legislation, a Chechen trade representation was opened in Riga at the initiative of Mr. Chevers, which was headed by Ruslan Akhtakhanov, Dzhokhar Dudayev's ecomomic adviser and plenipotentiary. By 1994, according to information from the Latvian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], nine people were already working in that institution, engaged mainly in the conveyance of oil and other raw materials from Chechnya to the West. The trade representation's financing was entirely covered by the currency reserves of the Chechen Republic.

In July of that same year, the Latvian special services detained five Chechens who had been involved in illegal arms deals. When they were arrested, several TT pistols with ammunition were confiscated from them. To the surprise of the Latvian state security employees, one of those detained turned out to be Beslan Abdulmuslimov—Akhtakhanov's deputy, and another was Khasmagomed Kilabov—the trade representative's personal driver.

Criminal charges were brought against the Chechens by Ilona Shchenavichyute, an investigator from the Vidzemskiy suburb of the city of Riga, according to article 218 of the Latvian Republic's Criminal Code (illegal carrying and keeping of weapons), while the Latvian Ministry of Justice refused to reregister the Chechen trade representation, and recommended that it be dissolved. Numerous relatives attempted to snuff out the heated scandal—visitors to Beslan Abdulmuslimov from his elder brother, Rivzan—an adviser to the Chechen minister of economics and finances, and one of the richest people in that region.

They were unable to suppress the matter. The representation was dissolved, and Mr. Chevers, the Latvian minister of internal affairs, was sent into retirement and went into business. Which, incidentally, people say does not differ greatly from the specific nature of his former state duties.

However, these efforts to cement the friendship of nations did not disappear without a trace. In October, 1994, at a republic seym [representative assembly], the national-radical party "Tevzeme und Brivibay" initiated the creation of a deputy group for the support of Chechnya that was joined by: Yuris Sinka, Ilmar Dalin, Aleksandr Petersen, Maris Glinblat, Alfred Zigur, Andres Rozentale, Ivan Sillars and Yanis Tupesis. And a month later, Mr. Sillars, the Latvian Seym's chairman of defense, met with Dzhokhar Dudayev, and discussed with him questions of political and other support for Chechnya.

Krasnodar Duma Conflicts With Local TV Station

954F1467A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent Aleksandr Bulygin: "Conflict: Muzzle for a Dictaphone; Conceived by Deputies of the Kuban Kray Duma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **To be sure, the deputies didn't need much time to figure out the "innovation." All they had to do was delve into musty ideological archives for half-forgotten gimmicks and stitch them together with modern patches. Moreover, it was all at hand: the kray's parliament has taken over the digs of the former CPSU Kray Committee, apparently deciding at the same time to inherit the methods of the unlamented former Kuban party boss, Sergey Medunov. The latter, with the blessing of then general secretary Brezhnev, freely penalized investigators, journalists, and undesirable bureaucrats whom he considered overly zealous. Especially as visiting State Duma members had obligingly sneaked in a secret that**

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their Moscow colleagues intended to draw up a "law on informational security," thereby offering the Kuban provincials a life-saving idea.

The new parliament has met in session three times, and each time the question of the speaker was raised. And each verdict regarding him differed from the other. First it was decided to clamp down on law officials to discourage any desire they might have of bringing criminal charges against Bagmut and his ilk. At the second session they nonetheless decided to set up a commission of deputies to investigate the allegations against the speaker. At the third session they eventually thought it best to protect their leader's nerves and not pester him with all kinds of clarifications. The deputies revoked their previous decision and laid the blame for spreading "rumors" about Bagmut's tricks on the press.

The deputies cast a trial stone at the Kuban state TV and radio company [TRK]. Its TV broadcasts, they declared, misrepresented events. All this aggravated the already oppressive atmosphere in the kray parliament. Angry expository speeches spouted over the microphones. To gratify their ambitions, the deputies cast aside all "letters" of the law, fiercely defending their self-assumed right to judge everyone and everything according to their own yardsticks of "justice." They were ready to accept any actions of their colleagues as ethical and just on the sole basis that they were "deputies elected by the people."

Forgetting their own decision against live TV from parliament meetings, the deputies suddenly began to scream about insufficient and biased coverage. Things reached a head with the demand that TRK chief Vladimir Runov be summoned forthwith to the session. But since he was sick they disgourged their righteous anger on TRK deputy chairman Vadim Kondrashin. Without even bothering to name the man correctly, they hotly demanded that Kondrashin be censured and dismissed as "unsuitable for his position." They even went so far as to attack the federal law "On the Mass Media." At the same time, with looks and gestures they intimated to the correspondents of local and central newspapers accredited to the parliament that all recalcitrants could expect the same!

And what did the speaker do? His only concern seemed to be to add wood to the fire. That, apparently, was why he kept encouraging the deputies: Today we need specific defendants! But nowadays journalists no longer allow themselves to be led on a short leash. In protest they all left the hall where lawlessness prevailed.

For all the polarity of their positions, this time the journalists were unanimous in their desire to uphold their dignity. However, the local deputies' fervor was fanned by those of them who are not averse to fanning political passions. I have in mind the malicious publications in the newspaper KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI [KN]. Hearing that speaker Aleksey Bagmut had filed suits against the regional KUBANSKIY KURYER and the independent kray newspaper VOLNAYA KU'BAN, a nameless NOVOSTI author hastened long before the trial to pronounce his verdict: The defendants, he declared, "were unable to prove anything convincingly." While Galina Mukhina, a member of the KN staff and deputy of the Kray Duma, assumed the role of lawyer, informing readers that in his abuses of power Bagmut "sought no personal gain". Even though Krasnodar journalists had told their readers of Bagmut's "innocent pranks" at the same time as ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI.

The court will have the final say in assessing Bagmut's shenanigans. Hearing of the case is set for the end of February. That, apparently, is why the obliging KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI is trying to preempt events. Perhaps the grateful speaker would help offset its court-ordered multimillion rouble fine for slandering VOLNAYA KUBAN journalists. Whatever one may say, nowadays defending an unjust cause is getting to cost quite a lot. And this inspires hope.

Kemerovo Industry Chief Views Economy

954F1528A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with A. Pronin, deputy chief of Oblast Administration for Industry, Transportation, and Communications, by O. Statsenko: "Industrialists See Neither Light Nor a Dead End at the End of the Tunnel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pronin] A decline has occurred in practically all branches and enterprises. Yes, in Kuzbass it is somewhat less than in the rest of Russia, but still... In coal production the decrease amounts to 7 percent, the output of synthetic resins and plastics is down 12 percent, consumer goods production decreased by 45 percent, the output of light industry goods shrank by 61 percent, and the output of the defense branches dropped by 60 percent. There are some examples of stabilization which are seen in the energy complex where coal production declined insignificantly and in December we worked quite well, but still the coal miners lowered the volumes of fuel extraction by more than 36 percent as compared with 1989. The various individual enterprises are at different levels. Look at the Azot, which is successfully earning foreign currency and paying wages on time.

[Statsenko] People would probably like to hear your views on that most painful of issues.

[Pronin] Even though compared to last year wages on the average rose by a factor of 2.7 in industry as a whole (the rise in prices exceeds that level—KUZNETSKIY KRAY], its wage indebtedness is growing—in October it increased by 14 percent. When Kislyuk published the figure of average wage indebtedness amounting to 37 days certain politicians began shouting: at some enterprises wages have not been paid for more than three months! But friends, that is just an average figure, not

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really an index. Some 65 percent of the reporting enterprises delayed issuance of funds for payment of wages and 60 percent of them with delays of three months or more. A total of 346 industrial enterprises failed to settle their wage indebtedness to the workers on time.

True, it is necessary to note that with regard to the level of wages Kuzbass occupies 10th place in Russia and on the average Kuzbass workers are paid more than those in Altay Kray by a factor of 2.1 and by a factor of 1.7 more than those in Novosibirsk and Omsk oblasts.

[Statsenko] If one is to recall the less fortunate branch of electric power engineering, it is staying afloat because the rates for electric power are steadily rising.

[Pronin] Yes, the rates are rising. But what is strange is that enterprises, it would appear, should be conserving electrical energy in such a case, but they are consuming it like they did before. The power engineers are not squandering the money they get on their own needs. There are no investments and they are attempting to do something for the future. The branch is being reconstructed. After all the high-capacity Petrovsk and Prokopyevsko-Kisilevsk stations have been frozen. Work on the resolution of that question will start in 1996.

[Statsenko] The most significant decline occurred in the light industry? The reasons for that?

[Pronin] The local products of the light industry are being actively forced off the market by foreign production. Individual enterprises in the branch are attempting to purchase new equipment and compete with imports. But these are exceptions. Privatization did not produce any results either. Here is a concrete example—the Belov Knitwear Plant, now called the Laska Enterprise. In the past Belov products were in demand—the plant has a great collective and its director has a good head on his shoulders. That plant was auctioned but it is still attempting to get up on its feet.

[Statsenko] In other words auctioning did not produce the desired effect?

[Pronin] The main goal of privatization was to teach individuals about property ownership. What was the result? The workers—joint-stock company owners are now asking with bewilderment: "What property ownership?" It is necessary to recognize that collective ownership did not produce an effect until we created a class of owners.

[Statsenko] Who will become the owners—directors of the joint-stock companies?

[Pronin] Not directors, but councils of directors must become owners who will be interested in improving the working conditions of their workers, refurbishing production and raising profits. The psychology of rank-and-file joint-stock company workers is simple: wages are paid and everything is all right, there are no headaches. The owner, however, has to fight for the property since he has invested his funds into the business. So far, however, egalitarianism predominates. As Svyatoslav Fedorov says, you offer the Russian peasant a bottle and say thank you when he takes it. In our case, however, nothing has worked out as yet—the peasant has not taken the bottle, in this case the property. I grew up in the village. Imagine an ancient fence, with an already rotting pole driven into the ground on one side of it. The fence is located on the boundary between the plots and God forbid the neighbor glances through a hole that the pole was driven incorrectly (occupies his territory). The resulting squabble would be heard throughout the village. Mine, that is mine and I will fight for it—we have not yet developed such a feeling.

[Statsenko] It seems you favor a so-called director's privatization?

[Pronin] What else is there to do? This, after all, is like a law of nature. The one who is weaker perishes, and whoever is stronger, more clever and agile, wins, to leap and bite off a bigger piece. In our own life whoever is richer and has greater initiative will be the one to buy up the shares. We cannot get away from the fact that society will be divided into the rich and the poor. The division into the poor and the middle class would be better.

[Statsenko] Last year we came very close to shifting to world prices. What did that lead to?

[Pronin] I do not quite agree with the reforms that are presently being conducted, whose slogan is "We will shift to world prices," since that is not suitable for Russia. Why? For that it is necessary to have world-class technology, it is necessary to learn how to work like the Japanese, the Germans, and the Americans are working.

[Statsenko] Prices must be regulated as before?

[Pronin] That is our position at the present time. I corresponded and had meetings with Soskovets and Kislyuk with Chernomyrdin, but they did not agree with our position. At the same time we proposed price regulation in a branch such as the fuel-energy complex and the railway tariffs, but we were told that there were no funds for subsidies. But prices are regulated throughout the world and money for that is being found.

Particularly since power engineers and railway workers say that our tariffs are 40 percent of the world price. Just imagine if they add another 40 percent. Take into account that railway shipping charges should amount to 8—10 percent of the production cost of the goods but in our case they come to 120 percent. This affects not only the shipment of coal but also grain. Nikolay Shmelev, for instance, says that only world prices would bring us out of the recession and we would resolve the crisis. We certainly would not resolve it! Russia must have its own prices! Take a look at an aspect such as scientific-technical progress—we are now lagging behind other countries of the world. About 10 years ago there were so many articles in newspapers and magazines on the topic

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of scientific-technical progress, now there are practically none because we have stopped building in the new manner, stopped competing, the banks are not investing in industry and foreign capital has not gone to work.

In the oblast foreign capital functions mainly in the form of joint ventures. At the end of last year some 162 joint ventures were registered. It is also necessary to note that 60 percent of the joint ventures are small (statutory capital—up to one million rubles [R]), 20 percent were medium-sized, and only 20 percent were large. Thus there is no radical improvement for the better in that sphere as of now.

The volume of exports from Kuzbass, however, increased to 30 percent of the total output of products in the oblast and exceeds these indices in many other oblasts.

[Statsenko] Kislyuk designates the problem of mutual nonpayments as one of the key problems last year. When will that question be resolved?

[Pronin] That is difficult to say. It is, of course, possible to act by using force. But just try and not ship the products! If the coal miners, for instance, do not ship the raw material, tomorrow their place will be taken by others because there is overproduction of coal at the present time, and as soon as you lose your niche it is occupied by someone else.

Much is due to the imperfection of the banking system. Payments take too long to move between CIS countries, regions, and even within oblasts—from 10 days to 2—3 months, whereas in Europe they take two hours. This also hurts solvency. The main obstacle on the way toward the resolution of this problem is the economic situation as a whole. As soon as price stabilization takes place, products will move. Let us note the positive result of these changes. At the present time, however, there is no money for subsidies, the miners are raising prices for their products, following the power engineers. Prices are soaring, as a result of which there is a lowering in the ability to pay.

[Statsenko] The problem of bankruptcy, how serious is it at the present time and will it be resolved?

[Pronin] We have numerous enterprises that fall under the bankruptcy law, but the question has not been resolved in a positive manner with a single one of them (none were declared bankrupt). The government is not ready to deal with that problem on a major scale. Economic managers are also indignant. There are some examples bordering on the criminal, for example where certain criminal elements were showing an interest in the glue factory at Leningrad-Kuznetsk, seemingly wishing to acquire it after its bankruptcy. These are the future owners of a bankrupt enterprise who would rescue it? This problem cannot be resolved without government support. There will be those people trading out of the iron street kiosks and then investing their billions in production?

There is another way? Official or state enterprises. There is the decree on ZIL to the effect that if that giant becomes a government facility it will receive extensive government support. I sighted the order on government enterprises pertaining to our oblast. Presently we are preparing documents on the Yurginskiy Machine Building Plant. It is possible that we will resolve these problems if the machine building plant becomes government property.

[Statsenko] The events in Chechnya and their effect on the economy of Kuzbass?

[Pronin] In part this conflict will affect the economy of the oblast as well. It will concern budget workers, socio-economic programs, and the social sphere. They say that war sometimes serves a good purpose (renovation of defense plants) but this is not so—to a great extent war destroys, to say nothing of the moral aspect. By the way, not wishing to be left behind, we have shipped 10 railway cars of coal to Chechnya free of charge and wanted to send a whole trainload but were refused.

Kemerovo Assembly Opposes Administration

954F1527A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 4

[Unattributed (name Tuleyev mentioned) article published under the rights of publicity under the rubric "Report Theses": "Deputies Do Not Want To Be Tamed: On the Conflict Between the Legislative Assembly and the Administration of Kemerovo Oblast and Ways To Overcome It"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Cause of the Conflict

The anniversary of the date when the new representative branch of power of Kemerovo Oblast received a mandate of confidence from the people is approaching. And the whole past period of attempts to implement its legislative powers has proven to be a vicious circle of ordeals for the Legislative Assembly.

When the organizers of the reform of the representative branch of power eliminated the "all-powerful" soviets of people's deputies, they promised to replace them with parliaments and establish civilized relations between representative and executive organs based on the principle of separation of powers. The deputies of the Legislative Assembly did begin their activity in April of last year set for such relations. The Agreement "Accord for Action" was signed and an extensive program of law-making activity was outlined; to realize this program talks on cooperation were held with the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Study of Law under the RF government, with the committees of the State Duma and the Federal Assembly Council of the Federation, and with other regions.

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It turns out, however, that the administration does not welcome either law-making activity or attempts to set up parliamentary control over the spending of budget capital and the management and disposal of oblast property. It has chosen an unconstructive path. Taking advantage of the Legislative Assembly's temporary lack of legal protection and utilizing refined methods to influence deputies dependent on it, it has adopted a course to paralyze the legislative organ's activity and make it a tame "department under the administration," in its "pocket." Where did the administration get such flagrant pretensions to legislative power?

There are several causes.

The First Cause. This is the result of the state-wide policy followed by the RF president to establish totalitarian power with obedient "oprichniks" [members of Ivan the Terrible's special guard] represented by the local head of administration and a facade of representative power on all levels. The disbanding of the soviets, the presidential edicts which "smother" representative power in the bud, and the delay in adopting federal laws which support the fullfledged activity of the legislative organs of the subjects of the Federation all prepared the soil for the local administration's special ambitions. A head of executive power had to have personal courage and decency to begin to establish democratic forms of interrelations between the legislative organ and executive power in these conditions. And few such people were found in Russia.

Note. For example, from the very start of the activity of the oblast's legislative organ, the head of administration of Samara Oblast established interrelations with them in the sphere of law-making and parliamentary control. At each session, at his own initiative he presents a report on the spending of budget capital and responds appropriately to deputies' queries and submits the needed information.

Arkhangelsk Oblast is *another example* of constructive cooperation. Representatives of the administration actively participate in parliamentary hearings and committee meetings, where they explain the position of the executive branch of power, present the necessary documents, and promptly respond to deputy queries. The administration's enactments are always sent to the Assembly on the day they are signed (this norm is reflected in the administration's rules). It has become common practice in the region to acquaint the deputies and specialists of the Assembly apparat with the administrative documents of the oblast administration. The oblast administration takes a respectful attitude toward the Assembly's monitoring activity.

In his statement at the meeting of the Council of the Federation on 17 January, the head of administration of Novosibirsk Oblast, I.I. Indinok, shared experience in cooperating with the executive branch of power. He said that when he is under extreme time pressure, he goes to the deputies personally and tells them about it, and together they seek a solution to the situation which has developed.

Could the head of administration of Kemerovo Oblast have chosen a path focused on cooperation rather than confrontation?

He could have, but obviously the desire to rule got the upper hand. Cynicism toward the representative branch of power was apparent from the very start: banishing evil spirits from the building where the deputies of the oblast soviet of people's deputies used to work, the "gift" to the Legislative Assembly in the form of a Statute which, in terms of reducing the rights of representative organs, surpassed not only presidential edicts but even common sense. In this way, the personal position of the head of administration and the temporary lack of legal rights created the political and psychological background to destroy the representative organ.

The Second Cause. The administration alone ruled in the Kuzbass in the period from October 1993 through April 1994. With lack of control by the representative organ, the scale of abuses by the executive branch indeed rose sharply.

Could the deputies of the Legislative Assembly elected by the Kuzbass population consent to such a pitiful role of "observers" which the oblast administration prepared for them? No, at least those who were not related to the administration by direct subordination could not. To be tamed in this way violated common sense and their moral qualities as people of honor and dignity.

The attempts of many deputies to exercise the legal rights of deputy control naturally aroused desperate opposition from the administration. What is happening in Kemerovo Oblast is happening everywhere that the legislative branch of power is beginning to check the administration's "feed trough," but nowhere is there such refined opposition to deputies as in Kemerovo Oblast.

That is understandable. Many threads of corruption and insider theft extend from Kemerovo to Moscow. Only a partial audit by deputies and law enforcement organs confirms that billions of rubles of the people's money are in practice lost from the budget. Some of the money for aluminum sold was not repaid but spent to buy apartments in Moscow and St. Petersburg and to acquire dachas and cars.

A large part of the money has been given out to commercial structures.

Many people are asking where is the evidence and why have steps not been taken yet?

Here is the proof.

To my official query, I received letter No 7 zh-805 dated 19 January 1995 from the chief of the central board for

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economic crimes of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, V. F. Soltaganov. And I quote:

"... cases of non-targeted use of budget capital have been established and in some cases the actions of the leaders of Kemerovo Oblast contain features of the elements of a crime—abuse of official position. The materials of the audit have been sent to the General Procurator's Office for review and for a decision on conducting an investigation."

On 28 December 1994, Deputy RF General Procurator Davydov confirmed this conclusion in his letter. I again read the letter. "As the audit showed, cases of irrational use and insider theft of budget capital in the oblast, which you point out, are taking place."

In the last 3 years, within the framework of the "Fata" program and through the commercial structures "Rodit LTD" and "Vika" and the joint ventures "Sibir" and "Soyuz Chernobyl" [Chernobyl Alliance], the administration has sold about 40,000 tonnes of aluminum abroad. Of an estimated value of 1.5 million dollars per 1,000 tonnes, the oblast has lost about 60 million dollars, and in rubles that comes to more than 100 billion.

Moreover, more than 18 billion rubles [R] were transferred from the oblast budget to the commercial structure "Sibeke" and to "Sibkon salt" in those years to buy and sell coal under the "Fata" program. Slightly more than 1.7 million dollars or about R5 billion were received from these firms. The question arises, where did the other R13 billion of budget capital go?

Or here is procurator's audit document No 7 14 94 from 20 December 1994. The "Kuznets" artel failed to turn over 17 kilograms of gold which it extracted in Mezhdurechenskiy Rayon to any refinery. It got to the absurd point where the "Rubin" artel was paid 2 kilograms of gold for a bulldozer job.

The questions arise: Where is the gold? Who got it?

Tell us, just how are these questions illegal and offensive? But instead of a persuasive answer, there are wails, shouts, and statements that the deputies are disturbing work! Whose work? What are they disturbing? Squandering of the taxpayer's money? Or must we be silent while the population is called upon to tighten their belts?

Why haven't effective steps been taken yet? Here is why.

The head of administration and his entourage visited acting Procurator General Ilyushenko and talked for a long time. And the result was that the oblast procurator A. F. Pakhirko was reprimanded for starting to check cases of abuse and ordered to go through certification early. Any sensible person understands: either stop the investigation or we will boot you out. That is how cynical the ruling regime is.

The Third Cause. The administration's failures in the socioeconomic policy it is following in the oblast.

Implementing socioeconomic policy is not only the administration's concern. The legislative branch of power ratifies the budget and development programs and is therefore required to know what is planned to be spent and how, and what, where, and how it is being spent.

The year 1994 is over. By tradition the leaders of all levels give reports on successes or on the lack of success.

From all television screens and from the pages of newspapers loyal to him, the head of administration with a smile on his lips assured the Kuzbass, Russia, and the president personally that the Kuzbass is practically a thriving region with a very contented population. The oblast statistics administration obsequiously confirmed what he had said (since even statistics are now his, in his pocket, they do not publish even one figure without the permission of the chief of the economics administration of the oblast administration, V. I. Sorokin).

But a simple calculation permits us to question the sublime life in the Kuzbass. Successes have possibly been achieved in terms of raw materials and metal exported, but real people are interested in something else.

So, just how much did we produce and consume in 1994 as compared with the base year of 1990?

Table: 1994 Indicators of Production and Consumption as Compared to 1990

Indicators	1990	1994	Decline, in Percentages
Meat Produced, thousands of tonnes	84.0	34.0	60
Poultry Meat Produced, thousands of tonnes	17.0	11.0	30
Head of Cattle (thousands of head)	240	155	35
Milk Yield per Cow, in liters	2,877	2,200	30

There was a snowballing decline in extraction of coal in the Kuzbass from 160 million to 81 million [tonnes] in 1994.

Housing construction declined from 1.4 million square meters to 546,000 square meters. We have not even turned apartments over to veterans and war participants yet.

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All Kuzbass inhabitants are witnesses to the endless rumors of how we have taken extensive "steps" in building roads. But few people know that only 7 kilometers are to be built in 1995, while more than 70 kilometers a year were built before perestroyka.

The reduced volumes of production have resulted in a higher number of unemployed; from 14,000 at the start of the year, it had risen to 18,000 in December 1994, plus hidden unemployment.

More than 100,000 people continue to live in the sanitary-protection zones of enterprises, that is to say, in territories with especially dangerous conditions of atmospheric pollution.

The infant mortality rate from deadly illnesses is substantially higher in the Kuzbass (10-fold or more) than in the developed countries of the world! And this is the result above all of the consequences of the Semipalatinsk nuclear explosions and our own atomic explosion in the northern part of the oblast. I have been talking about this subject for more than 1 year. I have turned the materials over to the International Court in the Hague. But up to this point, the government has not even issued a map of radiation contamination. People are getting ill and dying, especially children, and the cancer centers are overflowing.

Fourteen types of benefits, from medicines to health resort treatment, have been set up for the one-third of the population which was in the radiation contamination zone; and instead of that, they are still buying medicines, and you know what prices are like. That is the cynical deception of the population and the administration's desire to escape resolving the problem.

The structure of the diet has a clear tendency to reduce consumption of food containing valuable protein and vitamins. The proportion of meat consumption has dropped by 25 percent in the last 3 years, of milk—by 32 percent, and of vegetables and fruits—by 17 percent.

Is that really normal? Isn't that really a crime against our own people? It is certainly undermining the health of the population which lives in the ecological disaster zone!

That is the real state of affairs which the oblast administration is carefully hiding from the government and from most of the oblast's population!

And that is understandable! Who is the head of administration accountable to? Certainly not to the people. He honestly and extremely frankly says, "I am the president's man!" There is nothing to add to that, as they say.

The president's position depends on Kislyuk's successes, just as Kislyuk's stability depends on the president's durability.

And what about the deputy? He is accountable to the voters and he protects their interests. But in our situation he has been prevented from protecting not only the voters' interests, but even his own interests, which are defined by his deputy status.

Up to this point, the head of administration has deliberately failed to sign laws on the Status of Deputy and on the Recall of a Deputy, not to mention the Law on the Legislative Assembly. This is done specially; otherwise there will be no pressure mechanism.

The oblast administration is sparing no means in its desire to make the representative branch of power helpless. The spectrum of these means is extremely broad, from bribery to direct pressure, threats, and blackmail. Deputies who are managers have suddenly felt the fixed attention of the tax inspection office on them and the number of cases of unannounced audits has increased. Not everyone has had the strength to survive the strong pressure, and the ones most dependent on the administration's whim have wavered, it became clear, sometimes demonstratively supporting the head of administration.

But others who have not given in and for whom such concepts as honor, duty, and decency exist have experienced undisguised pressure.

For refusing to obey, Deputy Aleksandr Alekseyevich Filatov was transferred to a low-paying job without explanation of the reasons.

It is not important that human rights were violated and that they spit on the laws of the civilized world, because the country's leaders themselves do not live by the laws but by the president's edicts, and if you want to be exact, they live by bandits' rules.

Certain deputies are being bribed. For example, Petr Mikhaylovich Fink enjoys the special favor of the head of administration. He has been appointed the coordinator, but essentially the secret underground chairman, of the Legislative Assembly.

Why was P. M. Fink specifically chosen as the main weapon in the administration's fight against the Legislative Assembly? Certainly because he is their man and illegally enjoys all kinds of privileges and credits.

What happened as a result?

The enterprise which he manages did not pay a debt of about half a billion rubles to the joint stock company "Novokuznetskiy alyuminiyevyy zavod" [Novokuznetsk Aluminum Plant].

Recently I received a letter in which I was asked to influence Deputy P. M. Fink to repay the debt.

Why are we silent even when the law enforcement organs search P. M. Fink's office?

And he is still the "coordinator"!

Can I reconcile myself to that? And can such a "peace" stop the continuing conflict?

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I have named only some of the scandalous facts confirming the establishment of a regime of personal power of the administration and its deputies, who consider the budget their own pocketbook from which they spend money unchecked based on the principle: I like this one, so I'll give to him, but I do not like that one, since he did not sign a treaty on accord with me, or some such thing. It was precisely for this reason that deputies have not approved the report on the execution of the 1993 budget. M. B. Kislyuk was brought to responsibility and fined for failing to execute the decree on granting benefits to war veterans adopted by the Legislative Assembly and for failing to present all the enactments adopted in 1993. The trial was held on 6 January 1995 in the Central Court of the city of Kemerovo. It would seem that conclusions must be drawn, but the administration is once again blocking deputies' access to documents and enactments adopted in 1994, which blocks the adoption of the budget for 1995.

Monitoring of the execution of the budget is not a whim of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly; it is the practice of the civilized world. Despite all the diverse foreign experience, there are universal standards and a set of powers, forms and procedures of control.

In Japan, for example, the government is required to report to the parliament and the people on the spending of state capital and the country's overall financial status at least once every 3 months. And every Japanese person knows how each of his yen is being spent.

The establishment of a regime of personal power has resulted in the complete dependence of heads of administration of rayons and cities on whoever has all the money concentrated in his hands.

The successes of cities and rayons are at times attributed to one person, the head of administration.

Accordingly, the head of administration has gotten more awards than "dear L. Brezhnev."

Political censorship was instituted in the oblast after the new chairman of the GTRK [expansion unknown], M. Grebennikov, was appointed. As people say, we are on our way.

I received a letter where I was officially refused the opportunity to speak on the air live. I was merely allowed a recording with subsequent editing.

Not all information on the Legislative Assembly's work is accepted. And frequently it is in a distorted form with the mandatory commentary.

Conditions for Resolving the Conflict

A solution to this situation is possible, if the parties strictly observe existing legislation. And, consequently, the head of administration is required to sign and publish within the proper time all laws adopted by the Legislative Assembly which have gone through the established procedure for defeating a veto. The administration must stop pressuring the Legislative Assembly deputies, dictating conditions and the place for holding the sessions, and preventing them from obtaining documents and from exercising other legal rights of the deputies and the Assembly.

Ways To Resolve the Conflict Situation

Political Measures

The head of administration must receive the status of the people's choice just like deputies of the Legislative Assembly; and the head of the executive branch of power should find personal courage and, without waiting for instructions from the center, present an initiative to set elections himself. A situation where one branch of power is elected and another is appointed contradicts Russia's Constitution, which reinforces the principle of separation of powers. Incidentally, there are already precedents in Russia where appointed heads have been elected by the population (Irkutsk Oblast). Recently (in October 1994) the head of administration of Voronezh Oblast Kovalev presented an initiative to hold elections of the head of the oblast administration. In order to provide a legal basis for these elections, in November 1994 the Voronezh Duma adopted the Law "On Organs of State Power in the Oblast," which also envisions such elections. Kovalev signed this law.

And just what does our head of administration have to fear in passing through the crucible of elections?

Given such "prosperity" and the sublime life in the Kuzbass which he is always talking about, he will receive a mandate of confidence from the people with no particular effort, automatically so to speak.

At a personal meeting with the manager of the president's apparat in Moscow, S. Filatov, in order to eliminate all talk of Tuleyev's desire for power, I presented a proposal to the president to execute the decision to hold free elections in the Kuzbass which was adopted by the Duma twice. And I proposed this condition: "If you are afraid of me, I am prepared not to run."

Legal Measures

The activity of the Legislative Assembly and its interrelations with the administration must be put on a legal basis. It is clear that we cannot do without enactments such as the oblast Charter and the laws on the Oblast Legislative Assembly, on the Budget Mechanism and the Budget Process, on the Procedure for Managing and Disposing of Property, and on Programs for the Oblast's Socioeconomic, Cultural, and National Development.

Deputies who are dependent on the administration (heads of administration of all levels and managers) must find personal courage and adopt these laws in the second reading, while the head of the oblast administration must sign them.

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In Conclusion

The experience of other regions confirms that a compromise may be found even in present conditions. In places where disputes arose concerning the separation of powers, in particular when the Charters of the oblast and the kray were being prepared, compromises were found by joint efforts (Saratov, Tambov, and Amur oblasts and other regions).

And the powers of the legislative organs in those same Saratov and Tambov oblasts where the Charters were adopted are substantially broader than under the draft Charter for Kemerovo Oblast. In short, according to the latest information, Charters have been adopted and are in force in more than 12 regions; and roughly 16 subjects of the Federation have adopted Charters in the first reading. There are no cases anywhere where the administration, even if it disagreed with the substance of the Charters adopted, prevented them from being published.

In Great Britain, the birthplace of parliament, John de Lolm (in the 18th century) said of his own supreme legislative organ that parliament is able to do anything, and the only thing it cannot do is turn a man into a woman or do the reverse operation. The contemporary parliamentarians of the country of the "misty Albion" believe that if parliament decides that a particular man is in fact a woman, there is nothing left for him to do but subject himself to this decision for the sake of obeying the law. In other words, by law he will be considered a woman. In Russia the representative organs do not lay claim to such power. But the right of the representative organ of power to be a parliament, as Russia's Constitution records, must be guaranteed. We cannot take half a century, as the United States did, to win the right to a parliament from the executive branch of power, since we are not in the 18th but in the 20th century, and we must live by the laws of civilization of the present age.

And the Last Thing

Unfortunately, there is a popular opinion that the juxtaposition of the representative and executive branches of power is always a conflict which threatens society with trouble. But I believe that this is a natural condition. It is bad if the representatives of both branches of power embrace and sing praises to each other. Then the people's interests will certainly be forgotten! But to be absolutely honest, the basis of the conflict is the fundamental discrepancy in the choice and evaluation of the course of reforms. I believe this course is destructive and that it is criminal to support it. The reforms must be carried out in the people's interests, rather than those of a handful of elected persons. In contrast, the head of administration as the president's man supports and insists on continuing the present course.

Let time and people judge us!

Kemerovo By-Election Results Noted

954F1530A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Tuleyev's Slate Wins Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The oblast electoral commission confirmed the results of by-elections to the oblast legislative assembly. In excess of 30 percent of the voters of three electoral districts (the 8th District of Kemerovo, the 12th District of Kiselevsk, and the 23rd District of Novokuznetsk) cast their votes (voting by 25 percent of the total number of voters is required for the elections to be recognized as valid). In the 12th District of Novokuznetsk 22.9 percent of the electorate voted. In two of the districts, the 18th District (Novokuznetsk) and the 26th District (Prokopyevsk), elections will take place on 28 February.

According to observers those candidates sharing to a certain degree the positions occupied by Aman Tuleyev, chairman of the Legislative Assembly and opposing the executive branch of power won by a considerable margin. They included L. P. Sergachev, a politician and a dissident in the days of communism, well known throughout Kuzbass, who, by the way had serious chances of being elected to the State Duma, A. P. Borovikov, an activist of the Kiselev Movement of War Veterans, Labor and of the Communist Party, and V. F. Galichin, former deputy of the oblast soviet. In those districts where elections have not yet taken place or were considered invalid, supporters of the "party of Tuleyev" stand a very good chance of winning.

Observers note quite a few irregularities in the work of district electoral commissions and of the oblast commission itself—by-elections involved numerous violations of the law, the smallest of which was campaigning for the candidates on the eve of the election. There were quite a few scandals and court examinations which will hardly stop with the adoption of the results.

Kemerovo 1994 Crime Statistics Cited

954F1530B Kemerovo KUZBASS in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Ye. Breze: "Crime Will Decrease"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another tense, unsettling, and uneasy year has ended. Unfortunately it will be remembered as such by Kuzbass residents. One of the main reasons is the rise in crime. Let us, however, look at the figures. Some 45,358 crimes were committed last year in Kemerovo Oblast. That is 10 percent less than in the previous year. The number of crimes that were solved increased by 9.4 percent. By comparison with neighboring oblasts as well as per 100,000 population we have the best index. A certain quantitative increase in crime was noted in Guryevsk, Kaltan, and in the Belov, Ishmorsk, Prokopyevsk, and Promyshlennovsk rayons. The tendency toward a decrease in crime is being observed in other regions of Kuzbass.

The most serious crimes are crimes against the individual. Such crimes included 1,260 premeditated murders, 4,021 crimes involving serious bodily injury, 1,048

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crimes with a deadly outcome, 716 crimes with minor bodily injury, 346 crimes of rape, and so on.

Some 17.6 percent fewer crimes against property were registered. For the most part these are apartment robberies (a total of 29,744 incidents). Cases involving swindling are being encountered with growing frequency. Their number doubled. Extortion increased by 29 percent. There were 685 cases of embezzlement. Total material loss amounted to 926,680 rubles [R]. A total of 552 criminal cases were initiated involving that type of crime. 447 of them have already been investigated and 223 have been turned over for trial.

Wardship inspections are increasingly time consuming in dealing with the affairs of the underage. Adolescents committed 69 murders, 177 assaults with serious bodily injury, 4,271 crimes against property, and 73 rapes. Even though the total number of crimes committed by adolescents rose by only 4 percent, the fact that the ranks of criminals are being regularly supplemented with "growing replacements" cannot help but be disturbing.

There were 2,065 acts of hooliganism registered in Kuzbass. That is 36.4 percent higher than in 1993. Out of them 1,488 acts were committed in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The bottle continues to be a companion to all of our troubles just as its competitor—narcotics. The number of crimes connected with them has increased by 89 percent.

After the cited figures it is difficult to view the future with optimism. Still there are some grounds for it. The Siberian Department of the All-Russian Scientific Institute of the MVD of Russia prepared a forecast of the development of the crime situation in Kuzbass in 1995. It notes a tendency toward a decrease in the overall number of registered crimes.

That forecast, of course, is based on probability. In this case it is impossible to predict fluctuations in the occurrence of various unexpected situations in the sociopolitical sphere or the economic life of the region and the country. A decrease in the wave of crime is anticipated for the most part through a drop in the number of crimes against property. The growing tendency toward an increase in violent crime, however, will continue. There will be a rather high level of latent crimes (not accounted for due to various reasons).

The forecast compiled by that institute for 1994 was fully confirmed.

Kemerovo TV Company Controversy Detailed

954F15.30C Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by V. Popok: "Mikhail Grebennikov Wants To Deprive Us of Our Main Entertainment—Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As you already know new winds are blowing in the Kuzbass government television and radio company. Mikhail Grebennikov, the new chairman of the GTRK [State Radio and Television Company] issued an order "in connection with a change in the concept of television broadcasting and expansion in the broadcast range of Kuzbass GTRK."

In the opinion of a group of journalists (Nataliya Lakhreyeva, Stanislav Korneyko, and Andrey Andreyev), who unified under the name of "Department Five," "that order in fact liquidates political programming, and journalists not willing to change the topic of their programs are threatened with dismissal."

The new tendencies did not appeal to the main opponents of executive power, deputies of the LEGISLATIVE Assembly of the oblast Igor Kovtun, Yuriy Chulkov, and Dmitriy Kravtsov. They appealed to the residents of Kuzbass with a request to support their protest against "unconcealed revival of the shameful practice of political censorship in our oblast." The deputies fear that the disobedient "Department Five" will be replaced by "an obedient brigade of courtiers of the overseers with the goal of conducting a new brainwashing campaign."

The actions by Mikhail Grebennikov was evaluated as being illegal by the Kemerovo regional organization of the Republican Party of Russia. The declaration of the republicans, signed by their leader Vadim Ivanov, also mentions violation of the agreement of Public Harmony, which is seen in the actions carried out by Mikhail Grebennikov, representative of the oblast administration in TV, and contains a number of recommendations: the labor collective of the studio is to join the ranks of cofounders of GTRK while the Public Forum of Kuzbass is to create a supervisory council at the studio as early as possible.

In response to a request for a comment on the content of the order Mikhail Grebennikov stated that in principle this is an internal studio matter and that it would be more useful if the situation would not be dramatized, and especially if dirty laundry would not be hung out in public. He said that as the leader he is concerned by the low rating of a number of programs, including that of "Department Five," and low ratings mean low revenue. In addition to that he focused attention on the fact that "Department Five" has certainly not disappeared from the television screen, that it still exists and most likely will continue.

Mikhail Kislyuk, director of oblast administration, who initiated the change in leadership at GTRK Kuzbass, stated that he is not acquainted with the details of today's situation in television. In his opinion, however, some reorganization in TV was inevitable one way or another. That is why Grebennikov came. The governor promised to take a look and, at any rate, take heed of the fate of journalists affected by the "great turning point" brought about by the new leadership.

Gennadiy Mityakin, former head of GTRK Kuzbass (by the way he has far from exhausted his chances of

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returning—if the court case is won against Aleksandr Yakovlev, head of all Russian television, who signed the order dismissing Mityakin), evaluated the order negatively. He believes that the director does not have unilateral power to change the concept of broadcasting which is the prerogative of the artistic council of the television studio or the council of the television and radio company. Mityakin believes that what is taking place at the studio is the establishment of ideological control over the journalists which is why a change in leadership was required.

It is understandable that events at the Kemerovo TV are today being widely discussed in journalistic circles. Most of my colleagues do not view them as internal affairs of that television studio—our profession is such that everything that takes place in the journalistic shop must be publicized particularly in cases when such publicity itself is being hindered. In the view of a number of colleagues working in the field of television journalism Mikhail Grebennikov does not have a sufficiently clear understanding of the specific features of the matter which he is handling—he manages a creative collective like he would an industrial enterprise. The intentions of Mikhail Grebennikov to support the economy of the television and radio company have taken a turn toward the presentation of entertainment programs which are guaranteed high television viewer ratings, and are understandable and commendable. But there is the danger here of transforming all television programs into "chewing gum for the brain" and losing the intelligent viewers, who are quite understandably, few in number. Yet it is that intelligent viewer who watches Nataliya Lakhareyeva's "Art," Andrey Andreyev's "Time Manager," and Stanislav Korneyko's "Post."

Reorganization of Moscow Prosecutor's Office Noted

954F1540A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Rudnev: "There Are Okrug Prosecutors, but They Have No One To Work With"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The directive of RF [Russian Federation] Acting General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko evoked another reorganization of the capital city's prosecutor's office. Now the former rayon prosecutor's offices are called inter-rayon, and above them in the prosecutor's hierarchy are the newly created okrug prosecutor's offices. And at the head of the capital's oversight department, as before, is the Moscow Prosecutor's Office.**

Since 1991, efforts have been made to adapt the structure of the city's law enforcement organs to the administrative-territorial arrangement introduced by Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. At that time, 33 rayons of the city disappeared from the map, and 10 administrative okrugs appeared, which included 130 municipal rayons. The first to "adapt" was the militia: Internal affairs administrations were organized in the okrugs, and in the municipalities—sections and departments. Following in the tracks of the militia was the state security service, then the tax police, and other controlling organs and organizations.

Yet with the Moscow Prosecutor's Office and the court there was a slight delay. About two years went for departmental correspondence...

"It got to the point," says Moscow Prosecutor Gennadiy Ponomarev, "that we had to dig through the entire 'legacy' of the union prosecutor's office, the legislative statutes, the departmental directives of the Prosecutor's Office of Russia. We had to act quickly, but not to 'break any firewood,' in doing so. We had to literally 'grind' the mechanism of the prosecutor's office to fit the administrative realities which had been formulated in the city. Unfortunately," notes the city prosecutor, "we did not always find understanding in the Prosecutor General's office. One gets the impression that we and our concerns were a bother to them."

Ultimately, the city prosecutor's office agreed to an intermediate variant. The 33 rayon prosecutor's offices were transformed into the same number of inter-rayon offices, whose authority extended to several municipalities. The administrative okrugs in turn were secured by order of the city prosecutor to the 10 most experienced inter-rayon prosecutor's offices. In this regimen, the Moscow Procurator's Office began work as of 1 July 1993.

Only by the end of 1994 did the Acting Prosecutor General of the RF, Aleksey Ilyushenko, sign the order by which a new administrative level—the okrug prosecutor's offices—appeared within the structure of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office. They are called upon to implement supervision over fulfillment of the laws by the prefectures, other organs of management and control of the administrative okrugs, the okrug administrations of the militia, state security and the tax police.

A vital function of the new okrug prosecutor's offices is the organization of duty investigative-operative groups, the provision of round-the-clock arrival of these groups at the scene of a crime, work "hot on the trail" of murders, terrorism, taking of hostages and other especially dangerous crimes.

The new okrug prosecutors have already been appointed to their duties and have undertaken fulfillment of their responsibilities. And although their position is considered fully legitimate both in the Prosecutor General's office and in the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, some specialists have, as they say, some questions.

The fact is that the RF law, "On the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation," does not know the figure of the okrug prosecutor in the manner in which it exists in Moscow today. There is a prosecutor for the city of Moscow, and there is also a rayon prosecutor. But an okrug prosecutor?

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In answer to this question, they told me in the city prosecutor's office: It is true, there is no okrug prosecutor in the law, but there is a notation about "prosecutor's offices of the rayon and prosecutor's offices equated to them." Therefore, we will consider the okrug prosecutors as being equated to the rayon prosecutors.

Alas, the answer does not clarify, but rather complicates the situation with the new administrative level of the Moscow Prosecutor's Office introduced by order of the acting prosecutor general. Unfortunately, this is not only a Moscow problem, but already a Russian one. Because Russia still does not have a constitutional prosecutor general. And the RF law, "On the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation," adopted back in the times of R. Khasbulatov, has become hopelessly outdated. Yet the main thing is something else. The staff roster of the Moscow okrug prosecutor's offices list 293 persons. There are 258 vacancies in the Moscow Prosecutor's Office. In other words, the okrug prosecutor's offices exist, but where to find the workers for these new prosecutor's offices?

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